Price of Peace
Financing for gender equality in post-conflict reconstruction
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ACRONYMS

CAP Consolidated Appeal Process
CDF Community Development Fund
DDR Demobilization, disarmament and repatriation
DEPAC Development Partnership Meeting Committee
DFID Department of International Development (of the United Kingdom)
EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EU European Union
GOSS Government of South Sudan
JAM Joint Assessment Mission
MDTF Multi-donor trust fund
NGO Non-governmental organisation
PRSP Poverty reduction strategy paper
SPLM Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General (of the UN)
TFET Trust Fund for East Timor
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNTF United Nations Trust Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development

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BACKGROUND

Gender equality and post-conflict funding: What is the problem?

Crisis increases women’s and men’s economic and social burdens. However, women’s disadvantaged situation, their distinctive social obligations and responsibilities, and their exposure to gender-based violence and exploitation cause them to disproportionately suffer the harms of crisis and miss out on the benefits of recovery.

The international community is increasingly recognizing women’s needs and their contributions to long-term recovery, as illustrated by the passage of Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 and 1889 (2009). These resolutions affirm conflict’s differential impacts on women and girls, acknowledge the importance of women’s contributions to sustainable peace, and recognize the value of their full and equal participation in decision-making processes. Security Council Resolution 1889 emphasizes the need to develop effective financial and institutional arrangements in order to guarantee women’s full and equal participation in peace-building processes. It explicitly encourages the Peacebuilding Commission to “ensure systematic attention to and mobilization of resources for advancing gender equality, and to encourage the participation of women in this process” (OP 14).

The Security Council Resolutions emphasize two issues in particular—women’s participation and addressing gender-based violence. In referring to financial arrangements, Resolution 1889 emphasizes women’s participation. However, the reference to the need to ensure resources “for advancing gender equality” can be given a much wider meaning. It can be interpreted as questioning the extent to which post-conflict reconstruction finance contributes to gender equality in society at large—with equality encompassing the social, economic and political spheres.

In effect, during post-conflict periods donor funding largely substitutes for small or non-existent government budgets. The question as to how post-conflict reconstruction financing contributes to gender equality then becomes similar to that posed in other gender-responsive budgeting initiatives, namely how public funds (from donors) address the needs and interests of women and girls compared to those of men and boys. This is especially important given the dire situation in which people find themselves after conflict and the resource and capacity erosion that results from crisis.

This question is important from an economic perspective because the fundamentals of the macroeconomic framework set during the post-conflict period are likely to endure for many years. The nature of the framework will determine factors such as how the economy will grow, which sectors will be prioritized for investment, what jobs and opportunities for different forms of employment will be created, and for whom.

If key rights (e.g., rights to land and housing, rights to mobility, rights to transact in one’s names, equality in marriage) are not secured early enough, then poor women will be denied economic opportunities during post-conflict reconstruction. A disconnect between the democratic governance and the economic reconstruction agendas will thus affect the advancement of women’s rights, particularly economic rights. Opportunities to sustain women’s political and economic empowerment, promote inclusive governance institutions and transform societies are lost when mechanisms do not take women’s contributions and needs into account.

Questions of the gender-responsiveness of post-conflict funding are important beyond the economic sphere. While budgets and financing are economic tools, the monies that they govern are used to finance activities that extend into all areas of government activity. In post-conflict situations, donor funds are used not only to rebuild the economy and to (re-)establish administrative systems and law and order, but also to fund social services such as education and health. Decisions as to which sectors will be funded and what will be funded within them are therefore of clear importance in determining prospects for advancing gender equality in the recipient country.

Despite the importance of these questions, there has been limited investigation as to how post-conflict financing has promoted or hindered gender equality. The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) recently underscored the question’s importance by examining post-conflict planning frameworks across twelve countries, including six Post-Conflict Needs Assessments, five Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), six United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks, and over 394 project documents from Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) and Joint Programmes across six countries (UNIFEM 2010a). The planning framework documents are important as they identify the problems and the actions that need to be taken to address them, and thus constitute the basis for funding by governments, the UN and its partners.

UNIFEM used a two-step approach to analyse the documents. First, they conducted a content analysis of the activities, indicators and budgets, and identified whether these address women’s needs and issues. Estimated percentages were then calculated for every thematic area (e.g., the percentage of activities, indicators or budget lines that address women’s needs and issues out of the total number of activities, indicators or total budget). Second, they estimated the budget allocated to address women’s needs and issues by calculating the weighted average of all percentages estimated to address women’s needs and issues by area, with the total budget for the area as the weighing factor.

The findings suggest that this is an area that merits further exploration. For example, MDTF analysis using budgetary allocations shows that in addressing women’s needs and issues, only 11 percent of the budget is allocated to activities and only 7 percent is allocated to indicators. A direct budget analysis shows that only 6 percent of the total budget is explicitly allocated to gender issues.
In the Post-Conflict Needs Assessments examined, less than 5 percent of activities and only 3 percent of budget lines mentioned women’s needs. Low and diminishing levels of gender-responsiveness were also evident in PRSPs. Between 5 and 6 percent of the budget allocated to activities and indicators addressed gender needs, whereas the extent of inclusion of women’s needs and issues is only 3 percent at the budget level.

Further analysis in terms of major thematic areas revealed that the social protection and human rights, education and health areas paid the most attention to women’s issues. In contrast, though the budget for the area of economic recovery and infrastructure represents a significant portion of total funds, it showed the lowest degree of gender-responsiveness.

In an attempt to get more detailed information, the Gender Team of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) commissioned case studies in Kosovo,2 Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan and Timor-Leste. The case studies examine whether and how resources were allocated and used in post-conflict reconstruction initiatives to promote gender equality and address women’s needs. The studies examined whether gender issues were addressed through separate projects or through addressing gender issues in mainstream projects and programmes. They also examined how funding of post-conflict reconstruction related to their own budgets with respect to gender equality and women’s empowerment.

The research covered the full post-conflict reconstruction period, including early recovery and peace-building assistance as well as later assistance as the recipient countries attempted to move towards a more ‘normal’ situation. The precise time period varied from one case study to the next and these are detailed in each individual case study. Movement towards the normal situation is reflected by a shift in instruments used, with countries over time increasingly being assisted through standard instruments and processes used in non-conflict countries.

For future and current interventions, this synthesis report draws on the lessons that intervening actors as well as actors in the beneficiary countries can learn from these four case studies.

Methodology of this study

The main research question of this study is: “To what extent do post-conflict reconstruction initiatives allocate resources to promote gender equality, address women’s needs and involve women in decision-making around strategies and related resource allocations?” The research question included participation, but went far beyond it.

Several factors were taken into account in selecting the four case studies. First, they were chosen on the basis that in each of the four, gender issues are stated as a priority for the international community supporting recovery and peace-building. The case studies, therefore presented excellent opportunities to review whether these global commitments had been backed by “funding for peace and gender equality.” Second, they were selected on the basis that a conflict was of at least four years’ duration. Third, that the conflict had ceased or eased for at least the past 18 months. Fourth, that there was significant external involvement in resourcing post-conflict reconstruction. And fifth, that the selected cases spanned several regions and different types of conflict.

Though several of the selection criteria may have reduced variability across countries, it is important to note that it is difficult—and dangerous—to overly generalize with respect to findings on financing for gender equality in post-conflict situations on the basis of these four case studies. First, the nature of the conflict and gender issues differs across the case studies. Second, they differ in terms of location, size of population, religion, economic performance and prospects and poverty. Third, they differ in terms of the approaches taken by international actors.

The researchers for the case studies were: Luljeta Vuniqi for Kosovo, Mary Anne Fitzgerald for Sierra Leone and Southern Sudan, and Sherrill Whittington for Timor-Leste. The researchers were asked to “tell the stories” of these four post-conflict contexts and, in particular, to discuss the extent to which post-conflict reconstruction initiatives allocated and used resources to promote gender equality and address women’s needs. Researchers examined documents related to post-conflict reconstruction and conducted interviews with organizations and individuals who were involved in different roles and stages. This synthesis report is supplemented by case study reports that give the details of the findings of each. The research for the case studies was conducted in 2009.

Researchers were asked to structure the case studies in accordance with a pre-set outline. The outline was structured to reflect the chronology of events in each case study, starting with a short background section giving basic facts and figures, followed by a section describing the background to the conflict, a section on settlement of the conflict, a section describing post-conflict reconstruction, and a short conclusion. In practice, events have not unfolded as simply as this in most post-conflict situations. In particular, countries sometimes slip in and out of conflict several times before reaching what is, hopefully, final settlement. In Southern Sudan, for example, serious new conflict seemed to be emerging at the time of and immediately after the research was conducted. Timor-Leste experienced a severe outbreak of violence and civil unrest in 2006, seven years after the referendum which could be considered the end of the conflict.

Each section of the proposed outline included questions about key internal and external actors, governance, plans and budgets, donor programmes and funding during the period concerned. Each section included questions asking about women’s position and situation during that particular period, gender implications of government and donor policies and programmes, and women’s participation in processes related to the conflict or reconstruction.

This synthesis paper was peer-reviewed by target clients and internal and external specialists in accordance with the UNDP Quality Assurance Procedure.

The research was commissioned from within the UN family, and thus places most emphasis on the activities of the UN and its member states (i.e., on official donor assistance). The findings are presented in three sections. The first relates to development of plans and mobilization of resources, the second to the content of funding, and the third to participation and representation. The report concludes with a set of recommendations.
DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS AND MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES

Plans and budgets

It is widely accepted that budgeting should not be regarded simply as a bookkeeping exercise. Instead, budgeting is part of a broader planning and resource allocation exercise in which a country should draw up a plan of what it wants to achieve, identify the resources it needs, and allocate them to activities that will ensure that it achieves the plan’s objectives.

In many development contexts, this approach to budgeting is reflected in financial management reforms and projects and, in particular, initiatives to introduce performance-oriented budgeting and medium-term expenditure or budget frameworks. These initiatives generally propose that annual and medium-term budgets should be based on documents that reflect the long-term plans of the government or authorities.

Countries that want to access debt relief through the Highly Indebted Poor Country route must complete poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) to qualify, and in these countries as well as others that prepare PRSPs, these are often taken as the underlying development plans for budgeting. In other countries, national development plans are generally proposed as the basis for budgeting. Because donor funds are meant to be aligned with a country’s plans, the documents also become—or should become—the guidelines for donor funding.
The case studies include examples of both PRSPs and national development plans being used as the basis for donor appeals and funding. However, in the first post-conflict years, when funding is urgent, these plans—which tend to take considerable time to draw up—are generally absent. During these years, other documents are commonly drawn up to guide donor funding.

Timor-Leste provides an example of a country with both a Flash Appeal and a Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). Both of these instruments are commonly used by the UN to attract funding to respond to emergency situations. After the 2006 crisis, a Flash Appeal was launched in the amount of $18 million. Donors responded well, committing 14 percent more funding than was requested. The Flash Appeal had some reference to gender in that it noted that “provision of physical and material protection of [internally displaced persons] through addressing specific protection concerns including sexual and gender-based violence is essential.”

In contrast to the over-funding of the Flash Appeal, the CAP requested a total of $36 million for 2006, but donors responded with only 70 percent of the amount requested. Camp management and food were well funded (93 percent and 78 percent respectively), but the shelter, water and sanitation and non-food items sectors were significantly under-funded. Yet when neglected, the shelter, water and sanitation areas tend to have greater impacts on women than men.

While there are local differences, in terms of shelter, women tend to spend more time in their homes than men do and bear greater responsibilities than men in terms of maintaining the home and those who live in it. In terms of water, women tend to bear the main responsibility for collecting water when it is not available on site. They are also dependent on water for many of their daily tasks in caring for other members of the household through cooking, cleaning and other duties. In terms of sanitation, biologically and in terms of social expectations, women have greater need for decent provisions that ensure privacy.

Sierra Leone provides another example of a CAP that explicitly recognized the hardship faced by women and included some projects that addressed their needs. In the initial period after the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord in 1999, the fragility of government institutions led most donors to channel their assistance through the UN and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The 2000 CAP, at approximately $64 million, was 65 percent funded through donor contributions, while additional money was secured through carry-over funds for the previous year to make up the shortfall. The 2001 CAP was larger at $74 million, and was also only 65 percent funded, and without any top-up.

Both Timor-Leste and Southern Sudan provide examples of Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs). These were commonly established early in the post-conflict period (or even in the run-up to settlement) to assess what the needs will be in the post-conflict situation. More recently, JAMs have been replaced by similar exercises known as post-conflict needs assessments.

In Southern Sudan, a JAM for both North and South Sudan was established during the run-up to signing the CAP. The exercise was more elaborate than those in some other countries, as evidenced by the fact that what was planned as an 11-week process lasted 15 months. The JAM was led by UNDP and The World Bank and included the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Gender was specified as a cross-cutting theme for consideration, alongside conflict resolution, HIV/AIDS and the environment. Gender aspects were supposed to be included in the design of manuals, the composition of technical assistance, the development of capacity-building programmes, the design of some projects and in employment opportunities. Outcome indicators were to be disaggregated by gender, geographic area and ethnic group. However, no guidance

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was provided to the consultants on how to do this in practical terms. Further, some of the consultants felt that gender mainstreaming would be less effective than specific actions to support women’s empowerment and equality as the latter would be easier to track.

UNIFEM appointed two gender specialists, one for each of the North and South teams. Unfortunately, the specialists could not be appointed in time to brief teams on their gender checklists before the teams began their fieldwork. In addition, the specialists were not able to accompany the field teams or contribute to their questionnaires.

Nevertheless, three of the eight clusters—governance, infrastructure and basic social services—included gender-specific actions in their reports. Further, the JAM report acknowledged women’s needs in a range of areas. The report supported capacity-building for women’s groups and for women in decision-making roles. Rule-of-law programmes acknowledged international principles of gender equity. Investments in women’s health and education—such as accelerating girls’ enrolment and safe motherhood initiatives—were included in the delivery of services. And women were the majority of targeted beneficiaries in livelihood programmes.

The JAM report was released in time for the first donor conference, held in Oslo in 2005. The South’s JAM budget for Phase 1 (2005–2007) was $3.6 billion, of which external financing was expected to underwrite about $1.4 billion (high in international terms). However, donor expenditures were only about $550 million, leaving a shortfall of nearly $890 million. As a result, basic social services received only 60 percent of their required JAM funding. Given women and girls’ greater needs in areas such as health, this is likely to have impacted them more heavily than men and boys.

Despite all the effort and resources expended in drawing up the JAM, it was not much used. The Southern Sudan report suggests that the report’s inclusiveness (and perhaps lack of realism) was a contributory factor to its not being used. The authors were no longer available in the country to be asked about different aspects and recommendations, which was also discouraging in terms of the report’s implementation and use.

In Timor-Leste, The World Bank coordinated the JAM exercise. The JAM was drawn up by international consultants, each of whom was paired with a Timorese technical specialist. This approach was intended both to ensure that local knowledge was taken into account and to provide a capacity-building opportunity for the local specialists. No gender specialists were commissioned to provide advice or review the reports. At a meeting in September 1999, the report on the JAM was endorsed at a meeting of four UN agencies, the European Commission, the Asian Development Bank, The World Bank, and five bilateral agencies. The Timor-Leste JAM focused on short-term reconstruction priorities rather than, as in the case of Southern Sudan, specifying a broader development plan.

As noted, the case studies also provide examples of forms of development plans that are common in non-conflict contexts. These are relevant to this paper because they can reflect whether the presence or absence of women in parliaments and planning departments influence what is included in plans and related budgets.
Sierra Leone, as a very poor country that was eligible for Highly Indebted Poor Country funding, developed a PRSP relatively early on in its post-conflict period. Prior to this, in 2002, the government in conjunction with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs established the National Recovery Committee and tasked it with conducting a district-by-district survey of the damage that had been inflicted. The post-conflict needs assessment results were fed into a 15-month National Recovery Strategy (2002–2003), which was developed in a participatory fashion with civil society, the UN and other donors.

The $100 million plan prioritized four interventions: the restoration of state authority; the rehabilitation of communities; peace-building and the safeguarding of human rights; and revitalizing the economy. Gender came under peace-building and human rights, a section that was allocated just under $2 million. Women were referred to as being an important sector of the population but, unlike youth (who benefited from interventions through the National Youth Programme), no specific interventions were itemized for women. The recovery plan was presented to donors at the first Consultative Group meeting, which was held in Paris in November 2002—nearly a full year after hostilities had officially ceased.

Sierra Leone’s first PRSP, for 2005–2007, was launched in April 2005. One of the sub-groups created to develop the PRSP dealt specifically with gender issues. Donors committed $336 million for 2005 in order to underwrite the first year of the PRSP, of which 52 percent came from non-UN multilaterals (mainly the African Development Bank, the European Commission and The World Bank). Bilateral funding contributed a further 33 percent, while the UN system provided the balance of 15 percent. The governance and security sector was allocated 12 percent of commitments, food security and job creation about 45 percent, and human development the remaining 43 percent.

The second PRSP, which covered the years 2008–2010, was estimated to cost $1.9 billion. Government and development partners committed $1.1 billion towards it. The second PRSP was much stronger on gender equity than the first because both donors and the gender ministry ensured that principles of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women were embedded in the framework.

Other countries, which do not qualify for Highly Indebted Poor Country relief, have developed national development plans in the post-conflict period.

To date Timor-Leste has had two national development plans. The first covered the period immediately following independence in May 2002, and the second covered the period after the crisis of 2006. A third plan, covering the period from 2010 forwards, was being prepared at the time the research was undertaken.

The first plan, which was termed a “plan for reconstruction” was developed through country-wide popular consultations with civil society, including with women’s organizations. Consultations were also held with the Gender Affairs Unit. The plan named empowerment of women as a key priority. It highlighted elimination of gender disparities in health and education; social, economic and political participation; equal employment and pay; and zero tolerance of all forms of violence against women.
Funding for the plan came from the Consolidated Fund for Timor-Leste which was formerly the United Nations Trust Fund and had become the government’s central account.

The National Priorities Programme, which was presented at the 2008 donors meeting, was weaker on gender. The country report notes that the programme included gendered quantitative targets for only two of the six priority areas. The first target, with respect of public works, was specified as “15,000 cumulatively (women and men) employed.” It is questionable whether this is a true gender target, given that it does not provide separate targets for women and men. The second target, in respect of social service delivery, specified that “supervised delivery services” should be available to all pregnant women by the end of 2008. A further weakness of the programme was that the Office of the Secretary of State for Promotion of Equality was not included as one of the government entities with responsibility for monitoring implementation.

Funding modalities

Whether or not a recipient is in a post-conflict situation, analysis of donor funding is always difficult. Challenges include the multiplicity of donors (each with their own financial years, reporting formats and degree of transparency); off-budget funding where the money is not centrally captured by the recipient government or authority; different ways of capturing non-monetary assistance (e.g., technical or in-kind assistance); the possibility of double-counting (when one donor channels funds through a second, typically multilateral, donor); and differences between commitments, disbursements and expenditures.

With UN funding, the challenges are even greater. In particular, the amounts recorded in a document such as the United Nations Development Assistance Framework do not represent commitments. Instead, they are hoped-for amounts that depend on UN donors (bilateral and others) committing and disbursing funds. These challenges relate to attempts to estimate the total funds reaching a recipient. Further challenges emerge in determining what the funds are meant to be, and are, used for. Yet this information is essential for gender analysis.

Challenges in determining what the funds were used for increase when donors use funding modalities such as general budget support, sector budget support and sector-wide approaches, as encouraged by the 2005 Paris Declaration. The five overarching principles of the Declaration are country ownership; alignment of aid to country plans; harmonization of partnerships between development partners and the recipient country; managing for results in terms of planning, implementation and impacts; and mutual accountability. All of these aspects have implications for gender equality, as illustrated in a ten-country research project coordinated by UNIFEM.4

Modalities such as sector-wide approaches, general budget support and sector budget support are seen as ways of promoting the Paris Declaration principles. These modalities are often referred to as the ‘new’ aid modalities, although they were being used long before the Paris Declaration. Utilization of these modalities has increased over recent years, although perhaps not as much as the Paris Declaration envisaged.

In post-conflict contexts, in addition to the standard forms of budget support and pooled funds, donors also often provide funds through other forms of pooled funding. These include responses to CAPs and multi-donor trust funds. Advantages to promoting pooled funds include greater coordination and the possibility of attracting funders who might not have a base in the country and would be wary of providing funding independently. Pooled funds should reduce the analysis challenge in respect to funding as a whole (although not in respect of a particular donor). However, the existence of these funds presents both implementation and analysis challenges. Further, there are often multiple pooled funds.

The Timor-Leste JAM report proposed the establishment of two multi-donor trust funds (MTDFs), The World Bank-administered Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET) and the United Nations Trust Fund (UNTF). The TFET was intended to channel funding for studies, training, technical assistance, public works, rebuilding infrastructure and procuring goods for reconstruction and development in agreed priority sectors. The UNTF was intended to finance and build the capacity of the new national government to administer the Timorese civil service budget as well as to rehabilitate and re-equip public administrative buildings, police training, political party development, judiciary development, and other activities that would contribute to effective administration, good governance and the rule of law. No procedures were established to integrate cross-cutting themes such as gender equality into either of the MTDFs. Meanwhile, the senior gender adviser post no longer existed in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), ostensibly due to financial constraints.

The UNTF was also used to finance quick-impact projects and temporary employment projects aimed at restoring public services and helping to consolidate peace and foster reconciliation. The lack of gender analysis of the programmes made it impossible to determine how much of these initiatives’ funding was directed to women. The case study report notes that a gender assessment should have been done, given that the end-of-mission assessment was undertaken after Resolution 1325 was in place. More generally, the report notes that gender equality is considered a cross-cutting theme by both the Asian Development Bank and The World Bank, and in principle, must be mainstreamed in both operations and analytical work. Nevertheless, the MTDFs in Timor-Leste provide for little or no tracking of outcomes for gender equality.

In Southern Sudan, donors and the SPLM that constituted the government-in-waiting began discussing funding modalities before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed. Donors recommended a MDTF, and the SPLM said that they would like it to be administered by The World Bank.

The MDTF did not perform according to expectations. By mid-term, only 25 percent of committed MDTF funds had been disbursed. The country research report for this project notes that one reason was that cumbersome procurement processes resulted in long delays. In addition, neither donors nor the government provided all of the funds that they had committed. The case study report notes that the MDTF focused on longer-term development rather than focusing on providing basic services that would have provided a more immediate visible peace dividend.

By 2008, although the MTDF remained in place, four other pooled funding instruments had emerged in response to the MTDF’s gaps. Three of the new funds are administered by the UN, and three chaired by the Southern Sudan government. There are overlaps between the funds in several instances, including overlaps between the new funds and the MTDF and between the new funds themselves.

None of the funds were established with the help of gender experts. None have a gender policy or gender markers to ascertain whether they address women’s rights and equality. In terms of gender, one of the funds, the Department of International Development-initiated Basic Services Fund, requires projects to demonstrate a clear strategy to include women as well as different ethnic groups, returning refugees and internally displaced persons, children and people living with HIV/AIDS. However, the head of the Fund’s management team reported that she has not been successful in introducing disaggregated data to the extent that she had hoped.
In addition to the plethora of pooled funding mechanisms in Southern Sudan, there are approximately 400 bilateral projects, plus further funding arrangements such as the European Union’s Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme that operates through international NGOs and is administered by UNDP, and the UNDP Strategic Partnership Agreement with Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands that focuses on capacity building for governance and rule of law. This makes it extremely difficult to understand how donor funds are being handled. It also makes it difficult for donors to see how their funds are fitting into the bigger picture, and it is difficult for analysts to conduct comprehensive gender analysis of funding.

In Sierra Leone a UN-administered MTDF was agreed on at a donor-government meeting held in London in November 2009. The target budget for the fund is about $100 million a year over a three-year period.

There are other funds in addition to the standard funds. For example, in June 2006, Sierra Leone entered into an agreement with the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which resulted in a $35 million Peacebuilding Fund jointly administered by the government and the UNDP country office. The Fund’s priority areas are good governance ($5 million), security and justice sector reform ($15 million), youth employment and empowerment ($4 million), capacity-building within public administration ($2 million), and energy output expansion ($9 million).

In Kosovo, The World Bank also channelled money from other donors. During the reconstruction phase, The World Bank grants were provided through its Post-Conflict Fund, which provides for rapid response to meet immediate needs. In 2000, a Trust Fund for Kosovo was established with financing from the Bank’s net income. An unusual aspect of the Bank’s approach in Kosovo is that funds were channelled through a local NGO, the Community Development Fund (CDF), which The World Bank had itself established through grant support. This was done due to the absence of a government through which to channel funds.

The CDF supported women’s initiatives from the outset through grants for social services programmes and projects. Between 1999 and 2002, about 5 percent of CDF funds were allocated to women’s organizations and projects. The case study report welcomes this explicit focus, but notes the failure to mainstream gender equality throughout all reconstruction programmes. It notes further that women benefited very little from investment of the International Finance Corporation (the private sector arm of The World Bank Group and the European Agency for Reconstruction), which provided equity investments in the Pro-Credit Bank to support small and micro-credit to Kosovo businesses.

In its 2008 Annual Meeting (after Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence), the Board of The World Bank established a MTDF programme to support the Kosovo authorities in designing and implementing reforms relating to employment generation and public financial management. The European Commission and nine bilateral donors (the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) committed to contributing to the fund. There are, unfortunately, minimal references to gender in the associated programme documents beyond a commitment to disaggregate education-related indicators by sex.
Also in 2008, the European Commission Liaison Office in Kosovo assumed responsibility for management of the EU funds. The funds operate in terms of two financial instruments, namely the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). These are standard mechanisms which are also used in non-conflict countries. There are no gender-specific programmes within the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, although equal opportunity is named as a cross-cutting issue. The EIDHR programme supports civil society projects fostering democracy and human rights. Of the total $2.5 million spent on grants for civil society under the Political Criteria section, $530,000 was allocated for four projects dealing with women’s rights.

While all recipients have pooled mechanisms, in practice only a small portion of donor funding is effected through these mechanisms. It is therefore necessary to examine the activities of individual donors to obtain a full picture of the impact of donor support to post-conflict countries. However, this was not possible in the scope of this research, where the main emphasis was on the United Nations post-conflict support (though the case studies give some indications of the extent to which an emphasis on pooled support misses out on donor funding).

In Timor-Leste, for example, 28 bilateral donors were active at some time between 1999 and 2006, but only a third participated in the MTDFs. Of total funding received since 2000, 82 percent has been delivered through bilateral cooperation, and only 16 percent through the MTDFs.

The initial formulation of Sudan’s recovery and reconstruction was led by UNDP and The World Bank. It was supported by ten bilateral donors, the International Monetary Fund and seven other multilateral agencies, and 17 UN agencies. However, while this shows fairly extensive joint engagement, in 2009 Southern Sudan still had more than 30 development partners. At the one end of the spectrum, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) does not participate at all in pooled mechanisms. In contrast, the Department of International Development (DFID) and the European Union (EU) channel most of their funding through pooled mechanisms. However, the United States wields the most influence because of its long-term support to the SPLM in the run-up to the peace accord.

For 2009, 376 donor projects worth $600 million were reported. Bilateral donors funded 248 projects, while pooled funds accounted for only 128 projects. Donor funding accounted for 25 percent of the approved 2009 budget. The category of social and humanitarian affairs, which includes gender issues, received one of the smallest portions, at $29.3 million.

In Sierra Leone, donor funds account for about half of the government’s budget. This is substantially more than in the other case studies. Sierra Leone’s development partner profile has remained fairly constant since 2002. Currently, the European Commission is the biggest single donor, followed by The World Bank and the African Development Bank. The UN provides about 15 percent of aid assistance. About one half of aid assistance is multilateral. USAID funding, which is considerable, is disbursed entirely through NGOs. In contrast, Britain started providing budget support as early as 2003. However, by 2009 un-earmarked funding still accounts for less than 20 percent of all donor support.

For Kosovo, a substantial proportion of aid is channelled through the EU, mostly due to Kosovo’s geographic location. A further difference from the other situations is that NGOs provided far more development aid. An example that illustrates both of these aspects is that during 2001, the European Union’s European Agency for Reconstruction provided $1.4 million to the Kosovo Civil Society Foundation for grants to local NGOs working in areas including minority rights, gender, culture, reconciliation and capacity.
building. Since the unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, however, donors have increasingly channelled their assistance through the Kosovo authorities rather than through grants to civil society. Simultaneously, the portion of assistance provided as technical assistance rather than money has increased to a point where approximately 80 percent of aid takes the form of technical assistance.

Other donors also provided grant funding that included funding for NGOs. For example, USAID channelled assistance through an implementing organization, the Office of Transition Initiatives. In the three months between July and September 1999, the Office made 361 transitional assistance grants totalling $7.78 million. A relatively small portion of this aid went to civil society organizations. The total grant amount provided for women’s organizations from 1999 to 2001 was $39,763. In addition, more significant specific assistance to women was provided through the Hope Fellowships programme, which was launched after the immediate post-war phase and continues through to the present.

Similarly, for the Kosovo Women’s Initiative project, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees received a grant of $10 million from the US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. This funding was channelled through externally-based umbrella agencies that granted funds to local women’s NGOs. The availability of this funding led to large-scale registration of women-led NGOs after the war. However, activists complained that by the time local women were given the opportunity to manage funds, most of the money had been spent. Further, much of the money went to support traditional female activities such as sewing and hairdressing.

Overall, between 1999 and 2005, approximately 550 projects of women-led NGOs were funded and, despite the critiques, the Kosovo report acknowledges a range of positive outcomes. However, the amount of funds provided to NGOs decreased markedly from $400,000 in 2001 to less than $28,000 in 2004. This decrease happened at the same time as a decrease in other sources of funding and was not counterbalanced by increased funds for NGOs from the budget of the Kosovo authorities.

**Fund and aid management**

In line with practices in non-conflict countries, governments and authorities in the post-conflict contexts tend to establish structures and mechanisms intended to coordinate and oversee donor funding. Donors often have parallel structures that interface with these structures in order to ensure coordination and information sharing among donors. The case study reports describe these mechanisms, but do not give a measure of the extent to which the structures and mechanisms succeed in their coordination and oversight attempts. There are, however, some indications of the (limited) extent to which the structures and mechanisms incorporate gender into their mandates and functioning.

In **Timor-Leste**, a Donor Coordination Unit was established in the Office of the SRSG in the period when the United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste still served as the provisional government, with the SRSG at its head. The Unit was mandated to review and approve all projects and programmes, including direct funding to NGOs. There was no formal requirement that gender be considered in this review process.

More recently, the Ministry of Finance established a National Directorate of Aid Effectiveness to oversee donor activities and contributions. The report notes that at the time of writing, no link had been established to allow the office of the Secretary of
State of the Promotion of Equality in the Prime Minister’s department to monitor priorities and allocations from a gender perspective. From the donor side, the Senior Gender Adviser in the Office of the Deputy SRSG coordinates a Gender Theme Group with UN partners, but she is not invited to attend or report to donor meetings.

In Southern Sudan, the donor conference of 2006 agreed that the government would develop an aid management strategy that would be coordinated by the Aid Management Unit in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. The aid strategy that was developed is cited as one of the best in Africa, and was endorsed by donors the following year. The 10 budget sectors established by the Ministry in 2006 received technical input through budget sector working groups comprised of representatives of government, donors and, since 2008, NGOs. The World Bank, despite being the MDTF fund manager, does not participate in the working group meetings.

The Ministry of Finance is acquiring an aid information management system to compile a clear picture of commitments, disbursements, expenditures and geographic results. This system for monitoring activities by sector will have the ability to incorporate markers to track gender mainstreaming.

On the donor side, a Joint Donor Team, representing the leading contributors to the pooled funds (Britain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden), is expected to promote donor coordination and generally advise on fund implementation. One of the Team’s tasks is to encourage the government of Southern Sudan to adhere to its policy of treating gender as a cross-cutting issue.

In 2003, Sierra Leone established the Development Partnership Meeting Committee (DEPAC) as a ministerial-level forum for dialogue between government and donors. One of its tasks was to monitor the progress of recovery against the PRSP results framework’s benchmarks and indicators. DEPAC meetings were chaired by the Sierra Leone Vice President and co-chaired by UNDP and The World Bank. Civil society organizations were invited to meetings where they were felt to have an interest in the issues to be considered. Over time, meetings became less and less regular. However, the regular quarterly meeting schedule was reinstated in 2010.

As noted above, about half of Sierra Leone’s government budget comes from donors. Yet in 2007, only about half of the donor money disbursed to government was accurately recorded in the government budget. The Government of Sierra Leone is developing an online database, to be monitored at DEPAC meetings, in which donors can record funding data for use in the budgeting process. The report suggests that the database will provide opportunities for tracking resources with respect to gender. However, gender tracking will remain questionable until the data becomes more reliable.
Donor conferences

It is common to hold annual conferences for a recipient country, at which the government presents its plans and requests to donors, and at which donors can state their plans and, if possible, commit to. When examined from a gender perspective, where and how these conferences are organized raise issues of both participation and content. In the first post-conflict years these conferences are typically held outside the recipient country, somewhere in Europe. In later years, the conferences are often held in the recipient country’s capital.

Holding meetings outside the country restricts the numbers, type and participation of local peoples. Having conferences outside the country also makes it difficult for women to attend, given the challenges many women face in terms of their domestic responsibilities and possible resistance from family in being away from home.

In Timor-Leste, the first five donor meetings preceded independence and were held outside the country from 1999 to 2001. Participants included civil society representatives, donors and representatives of the Transitional Administration. Rede Feto, the Timorese women’s network, was among the civil society organizations that presented at the third, fourth and fifth meetings. The network also presented at subsequent donor meetings held inside the country. A presentation by Rede Feto at the 2009 meeting described the priorities that they hoped the donor community would consider in very broad terms, namely that “all programmes must pay special attention to gender, and not include it as an afterthought.”

Despite the provision for Rede Feto input, the Timor-Leste report notes that donor meetings have never included gender issues as an agenda item. None of the donor conferences committed any specific resources for gender equality or women’s empowerment.

In Sudan, UNIFEM and Norway sponsored a symposium of women from North and Southern Sudan that coincided with the first donors’ conference. Both were held in Oslo in April 2005. The women attending the symposium called for 30 percent representation of women at all levels in all sectors of the economy, and asked that 80 percent of donor resources be allocated to women’s issues and community development. They specified their priorities as education and health; economic, legal and political empowerment; and women’s resource centres. The delegates afterwards believed they had heard promises that a gender “window” would be opened in the MDTF, but there was no follow-through on this.

At the donor conference held in Paris the following year, cross-cutting themes included women and children. It was acknowledged that both affirmative action and mainstreaming were needed to ensure appropriate attention to gender. The Minister for Education was the only government representative to present gender-related requests. At the following year’s donor conferences, which were held in Juba for the South and in Khartoum for the North, there was virtually no mention of gender.

In Kosovo, The World Bank and the European Commission took the lead in organizing international economic assistance efforts, through their joint chairing of a High-Level Steering Group that included the United States and other major donors. The first donor conference was held in Brussels in July 1999, and concentrated on short-term, mainly humanitarian, needs arising from the return of refugees. Four months later, in November 1999, a second donor conference was held. The second conference focused on reconstruction efforts. From this time onwards, international donors increasingly focused on economic development rather than on humanitarian assistance.

5. Rede Feto, Presentation to Timor-Leste Development Partners’ Meeting, Dili, March 2009.
than on the humanitarian and reconstruction needs that were the focus of earlier years. Over time, the size of donations reduced as interest shifted to other international crisis areas.

Soon after Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, the European Commission convened a donor conference in Brussels, attended by representatives from 37 countries and 16 international organizations. The Kosovo authorities presented Kosovo’s economic strategy and investment priorities as reflected in the Kosovo Medium Term Expenditure Framework 2009–2011. The framework was structured around economic growth, successful implementation of the Status Settlement, good governance, and social stability (including poverty alleviation). Each of these areas was broken down into more specific policy priority areas. Women’s priorities were specified only within the health sector of the document.

Overall, it appears that minimal attention was given to gender issues at these conferences, and minimal or no space was made available for presenting women’s viewpoints and needs.

**Ownership and technical assistance**

Donor attempts to promote gender equality through their assistance risk evoking the argument that gender equality is a foreign, western imposition. The argument carries weight in situations where donors state that they believe in country ownership and that their assistance is intended to support locally-developed plans. The risk is exacerbated when a substantial proportion of aid is in the form of technical assistance by foreign experts.

The extent to which aid takes the form of technical assistance varies across the case studies. In Timor-Leste, at the far end of the spectrum, capacity development of national state institutions is the single largest activity item supported by donor assistance, with a substantial portion of this assistance taking the form of international advisers. In contrast, in Southern Sudan there is comparatively little non-monetary-related involvement by donors as, from the start, government officials were wary of this technical assistance. The danger of gender being perceived as a foreign imposition by foreign advisers is thus perhaps particularly relevant in Timor-Leste.

In **Timor-Leste**, the UN Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste was the first United Nations peacekeeping mission mandated with responsibility for establishing all functions and ministries of government, including a democratically elected representative body charged with developing the first Constitution. In effect, the Transitional Administration was the transitional government. The structures of government were established initially by international staff with Timorese counterparts and then with the process of ‘Timorisation’ government positions were occupied by national civil servants. This approach was felt necessary as Indonesian civil servants had been concentrated in the higher grades of the civil service.

The case study report quotes the SRSG as commenting, when discussing the challenges of the Transitional Administration effectively serving as government, on the constraint of “an almost total lack of knowledge of the Timorese economy and society.”

Knowledge of a particular society is particularly important when it comes to gender, in that while there are some common patterns that cross countries, gender is essentially a social construct that varies according to the particular society in which it is constructed.

The question of imposition of foreign values is not confined to technical assistance. Technical assistance was limited in **Southern Sudan**. Nevertheless, the Southern Sudan report notes the importance of engaging with ordinary men and women in the community as to what equitable resource allocation means and how social change will affect family and social structures. It further suggests that for this engagement to happen effectively, programmes and projects must have staff on the ground that understands the community and works with them intensively.

WHAT IS FUNDED?

Finding gender in budgets and funding strategies

Each of the case study reports attempts to analyse funding flows from a gender perspective by identifying both the (few) targeted gender-specific interventions as well as the gender implications of mainstream allocations. When the requisite information is available, the analysis is done in terms of pooled fund allocations and allocations by individual donors and UN agencies. It is also done in some cases with respect to the overall recipient budget. The latter is important to the extent that increasingly, donor funds that feed into government budgets and assist countries in achieving their objectives are reflected in national plans.

The Southern Sudan report discusses the gender implications of the government’s priority sectors for its budget, which includes both donor and internal revenue. The discussion includes some sectors—such as roads—which would be considered by many to have limited gender relevance. The report focuses on how access to roads and transport can be used to hamper or hinder women’s economic empowerment. The report also refers to other initiatives that might assist with women’s economic empowerment. In respect of the top priority area, security, the report notes that that at least 60 percent of the budgetary allocations go towards the salaries of arms-bearing men. However, donors underwrite only 4 percent of security sector expenditures and thus have limited influence in this sector. In education and health, the report more easily finds initiatives that directly address women’s needs and gender issues, and discusses gender issues—including both gender-based violence and less obvious issues—with respect to the non-priority rule of law sector.
Other case study reports detail the interventions funded by UN agencies and specific donors. The Kosovo report is the most detailed in this respect, with subsections discussing each of the major donors. Key donor initiatives that are not mentioned elsewhere in this report are:

- A grant of $3.5 million from the European Union, aimed at supporting elections in Kosovo, which included provision for a special focus on vulnerable groups of the population, including women;
- The UNDP Village Employment and Rehabilitation Programme, funded by the European Agency for Reconstruction, funded approximately 115 sub-projects, some of which promoted women’s employment through the establishment of handicraft centres. Ongoing programmes that provide assistance with respect to ‘minority returns’ also included some targeted activities for women; and
- UNIFEM provided ongoing support for women’s engagement in peace processes in south-east Europe. This includes support through the project Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in South-East Europe. The UNIFEM project also supports monitoring of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 by the Kosovo Women’s Network.

Reconstruction and development

Conflict inevitably results in damage to infrastructure and disruption of services. The immediate post-conflict situation thus requires reconstruction efforts that attempt to place the country at least in the situation that it was in prior to the conflict. Such reconstruction involves (re-)building physical infrastructure, as well as (re-)building institutions related to democracy and economic government. In simple terms, this reconstruction effort is seen as a necessary first step before a country can follow—and be assisted in terms of—a normal development trajectory typical of other developing countries. Where conflict has occurred over a long period, as in some of the case studies, the reconstruction challenge is enormous.

In the immediate post-conflict situation, immediate needs require humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian assistance is also needed when conflict re-emerges during peace processes or after settlement. The Sierra Leone report describes how, when the peace process hit snags in May 2000, most relief agencies were evacuated and humanitarian assistance was suspended for several months. In the second half of 2000, relief workers began coming back.

The report describes how these agencies attempted to address both general and gender-specific needs. For example, the United States earmarked funds for psychosocial assistance ($1.5 million), sexual and gender-based violence run by the International Rescue Committee ($250,000) and a gynaecological surgery through the International Medical Corps ($725,000). However, these programmes lost momentum once the peace agreement took hold and development assistance focused on post-conflict issues.

As noted, reconstruction is typically envisaged as including the reconstruction of government structures and processes (often damaged during conflict), and building of physical infrastructure. Reconstruction efforts thus generally include initiatives focusing on governance and rule of law. These initiatives often include large components related to capacity-building and technical assistance.

Both the Timor-Leste and Southern Sudan reports call into question the term ‘reconstruction’, given that government structures and processes had to be constructed from scratch. In the case of Timor-Leste, the country had previously been ruled as a province of Indonesia, and with the settlement virtually all senior and skilled officials, the majority of whom were Indonesian, left. In
Southern Sudan, the Khartoum government had placed minimal infrastructure and staff in Southern Sudan, so there was—and always had been—a vacuum.

Despite these difficulties with concepts, in all the case studies donors conceived their assistance in the early period as focusing on reconstruction and/or humanitarian assistance, with the hope that later assistance could focus on development similarly to non-conflict countries. This conception of different elements of assistance influenced the establishment of funding mechanisms.

Sierra Leone’s UN operations are organized differently from those in other post-conflict countries, in an attempt to address the reconstruction-development tension. Details of the arrangement are presented here to illustrate some of the complexities.

In Sierra Leone, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone was mandated to lead the UN system. Instead of a CAP (which traditionally focuses on emergencies) or a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (which traditionally focuses on development), the Peacebuilding Office is meant to base its operation on a Joint Vision written by a team led by the Executive Representative of the Secretary General and intended to support the PRSP 2008–2011.

The Sierra Leone report notes that the Joint Vision methodology does not include a systematic process for gender mainstreaming. The Joint Vision does include one gender-specific initiative, a $7 million UNIFEM programme to promote gender equity and women’s rights.

The overall target budget for the UN-administered MDTF established at the November 2009 donor-government meeting was $100 million per year over a three-year period. One complication—which illustrates some of the problems with lags in timing—is that the Joint Vision was meant to support the implementation of the PRSP, which was drawn up for the period 2008–2011, while the three-year period the MDTF was meant to support started only in late 2009 or early 2010. Further, while the Joint Vision is described as spanning reconstruction and development, it has not prevented the launch of parallel appeals. The Sierra Leone report gives the example of an appeal made at the 2009 Consultative Group meeting tabled by the National Commission for Social Action (the government’s reconstruction agency), for funding further reparations to war victims. This was the same meeting at which the Joint Vision was tabled. These complexities complicate attempts to ensure that gender equality is addressed across all financing efforts.

**Gender machineries**

As with several other topics, the topic of gender machineries spans different gender equality-related concerns. First, the establishment of these institutions can be seen as part of post-conflict reconstruction in that they are part of the government and governance set-up of a country. The question then arises as to whether funds or other resources were allocated to establish and maintain these structures. Second, these institutions provide a channel for gender advocates’ participation in planning, budgeting and related activities with respect to post-conflict financing.

Gender machineries are highlighted in all of the case studies, and all reports point to the limited funds available for these. Concerns with the extent of underfunding are also highlighted in all reports. The case studies also point out that in general, the machineries depend on donor funds for programmes and projects and, in the case of Southern Sudan, for basic infrastructure.

In Timor-Leste, there was no provision in the Transitional Government structure for a national machinery for women. However, after the arrival of a senior gender adviser in late March, models of regional women’s machineries were evaluated, and a Gender Affairs Unit was established by mid-2000. The Unit initially consisted of six foreign international staff. Other departments obtained budgetary support for local recruitment by mid-2000, but the Gender Affairs Unit’s budget submission was initially rejected on the grounds that it was not an official government department. After leading Timorese women objected, the Unit secured the necessary budget line.
Lacking a programmatic budget line from the Transitional Administration government, the Gender Affairs Unit raised funding from bilateral and multilateral donors. The Transitional Administration subsequently provided half the funds for a three-week workshop for women candidates in the run-up to the elections, with UNIFEM providing the other half. After the elections, the Gender Affairs Unit became the Office of the Advisor for the Promotion of Equality. The Office of the Advisor received an operational budget through the Prime Minister’s Office, but again received no programmatic budget on the grounds that its focus was policy, gender mainstreaming and capacity development. In 2007, the Office of the Advisor was expanded and upgraded to become the Secretary of State for Promotion of Equality, which was associated with a cabinet position.

In Southern Sudan, the Ministry for Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs replaced the SPLM’s wartime Secretariat for Women’s and Children’s Affairs. One of the new Ministry’s main mandates was to ensure that the 25 percent quota for women in public office was implemented. It was thus focused primarily on internal representation issues. However, gender directorates were created in each state with a view to eventual gender mainstreaming, and a gender desk was created in the Ministry of the Interior to monitor women’s rights.

In 1988, the Government of Sierra Leone established a Women’s Bureau on ratifying the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In 1993, it established a Gender Desk in the Office of the Head of State in 1993. The Ministry of Gender and Children’s Affairs was created in 1996 at the peak of the women’s peace movement activities, but was merged with the Ministry of Social Welfare in 1998. The ministry’s gender division was upgraded to a directorate in 2010. The ministry recommends that a focal point be established in each line ministry, and that a woman of senior position be appointed in all development units to safeguard equitable delivery to women in development plans. These recommendations have not been implemented.

In Kosovo, the Interim Administration Office of Gender Affairs was established in 2000, with the mandate to facilitate the mainstreaming of a gender equality perspective into the substantive operations of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission. The Office received an annual budget of $50,000 from the Kosovo Consolidated Budget from 2003 until 2006, but the case study report observes that the interim authorities did not take the office seriously, as evidenced by the fact that it was moved downwards in the hierarchy from the office of the Special Representative to that of the Deputy. Despite this and other difficulties, the Office of Gender Affairs contributed to the establishment of the subsequent Office (and later Agency) for Gender Equality and provided support in drafting the Gender Equality Law. It also advocated for the 30 percent quota for women in parliament.

What is noticeable about the descriptions of gender machineries across the four case studies is that there is little, if any, reference to these bodies being involved in the mainstream planning and negotiations around post-conflict funding.
Gender policies

Gender policies are relevant when considering what is funded. First, there is the question of whether or not a gender policy exists at all. If gender were fully mainstreamed into all other policies, such a policy might not be necessary. However, given that other policies rarely fully mainstream gender, a gender policy can indicate the key gender issues and provide guidance as to where and for what funding is needed. This gives rise to a second question: Whether the issues highlighted in the gender policy receive funding support and, if so, whether this is adequate.

Each of the case studies has seen policy development with respect to women and/or gender. The extent to which this policy has been officially approved varies, as does the extent to which it has been funded and implemented. Donors have often supported the development of policies with both financial and other resources. However, the funding does not necessarily extend into implementation after the development of the policies.

The Timor-Leste report notes that the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality planned to develop a National Policy for Women that covers women’s political participation, domestic violence, and gender training and education for public servants. However, this has been put on hold for various reasons, including the fact that there is a growing body of laws and a Cabinet resolution7 that presents a national policy framework on these issues.

In Southern Sudan, a Gender Policy Framework was completed in 2009. The framework covers gender-based violence, women’s education, health and livelihoods. At the time the research was undertaken, both government and donors (through the MDTF) had agreed to fund a three-year $10 million Gender Support and Development Project to take this framework forward and to provide for more mundane needs (e.g., a new building and equipment for the Ministry).

In Sierra Leone, policies on gender mainstreaming and women’s advancement were drawn up in 2000. Gender legislation was enacted in mid-2007. The report of a national survey on gender-based violence conducted in 2008 calls for a national gender-based violence strategy. A national four-year strategic plan for women calls for affirmative action in the form of a quota system that allocates 30 percent of participation, representation and resource allocation to women. The plan is scheduled to be launched in 2010.

Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs has also drawn up a national action plan for Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820. The draft was adopted in September 2009 through a national consultative process that included UN agencies. In October 2009 UNIFEM and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) sponsored a workshop in conjunction with the gender ministry on how to implement the plan and foster accountability. Sierra Leone will, if it implements the recommendations, become the sixth country in the world to develop indicators to monitor implementation of these resolutions.

The Ministry also drafted three laws that were enacted in 2007. The Domestic Violence Act, the Registration of Customary Marriage and Divorce Act and the Devolution of Estate Act all reflect demands expressed by women war victims during the truth and reconciliation process. Sexual Offences and Matrimonial Causes Bills have also been developed and, if passed, will help to address gender-based violence. A law against female genital mutilation is also being considered.

In Kosovo, the idea of developing a plan for gender equality emerged in civil society circles immediately after the war of 1999. UNIFEM facilitated and provided funding for the drafting of the policy. Kosovar women experts finalized the plan from 2002 to 2003, and it was formally adopted by Kosovo institutions in April 2004. In the same year, the Kosovo authorities passed the Law on Gender Equality. This law provided for the establishment of a range of institutional gender mechanisms at local and national level.

7. A 19 March 2008 Council of Minister’s resolution established a network of gender focal points in line ministries and districts as the mechanism for the integration of a gender perspective in government development programmes, as well as in policies and legislation. The Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality SEPI is revising the cabinet resolution.
These descriptions suggest that while policies now exist in all four, they have not necessarily been implemented, and there appears to have been limited, if any, attention paid to the question of the policies’ financing. All policies include representation of women, but representation alone will not succeed in ensuring that ordinary women’s needs will be addressed.

**Demobilization, disarmament and repatriation**

General budget analyses repeatedly raise the issue of the difficulty of analysing military and related budgets. In some cases, the military budgets are not made public at all. In other cases, some information is provided but less than for other sectors that are considered less sensitive.

In post-conflict situations, security becomes even more of an issue than normal. It thus becomes especially important to analyse security-related funding. It is important because this sector is likely to constitute a larger portion of combined government-donor funding than usual. In Sierra Leone, the demobilization, disarmament and repatriation (DDR) programme that ran from 1998 to 2001 was significant enough to warrant its own multi-donor trust fund. In addition, the approach to security sector issues affects general outcomes.

At its most simplistic, security funding affects general outcomes because the more resources are devoted to security, the less will be available for other needs. At first glance, the gender reading of this trade-off would be firmly in favour of less security spending (because the direct beneficiaries, in terms of those who receive salaries and direct benefits, will be predominantly male), and instead favour more spending on general service expenditures (where, particularly for social services, women often predominate among beneficiaries). A more nuanced reading presents a more complicated picture. In particular, a sudden curtailing of expenditure on security will result in large numbers of men, many of them young, and virtually all with training and experience of violence, ending up unemployed, poor, angry and disempowered. This outcome is not good for the men concerned, or for the women with whom they interact. In addition, it is important to consider how resources allocated to the security sector are prioritized.

Several of the papers illustrate the issues raised when discussing DDR, and—in particular, the first element of this which envisages a (usually drastic) reduction in the size of the armed forces. While the second element envisages that those who are retrenched will lose their access to arms, in practice this is difficult to effect. There is the risk that those who are retrenched will not only be unemployed, poor and angry, but also armed.

In **Southern Sudan**, the report notes that DDR has not yet occurred to any noticeable extent. It explains this by the fact that the Southern Sudan administration does not want to move forward on this until it knows the outcome of the 2011 referendum on whether or not Southern Sudan secedes, as the outcome could well return the country to conflict.

In **Sierra Leone**, the DDR programme ran from 1998 to 2001 and was supported through a multi-donor trust fund managed by The World Bank. The DDR programmes targeted about 75,000 ex-combatants and attempted to avoid the dangers of a simple retrenchment. In particular, 80 percent of those who were retrenched participated in vocational or skills training programmes to prepare them for the transition to civilian life. However, less than half of those who completed training subsequently found paid employment. Women were disproportionately represented among those who could not find jobs.
In Sierra Leone, many women had been combatants and, though their numbers were less than those of men, those who had been combatants were also among the beneficiaries of DDR. The report notes concerns that women were under-represented in the DDR programmes. One reason offered was that women’s husbands took their weapons so that they could qualify for the programme instead. Further, some of the roles played by women in the conflict, such as camp followers and abducted sex slaves, did not qualify them for DDR benefits. Other women did not come forward because of the perceived stigma attached to being a rebel combatant. International NGOs who were providing assistance to female camp followers stayed away from the DDR camps in protest against government’s refusal to provide assistance to the victims of the war. While this argument had some validity in gender terms, in that victims might be predominantly female, it in effect denied assistance to other women, the camp followers. Lastly, large numbers of sex slaves who were not officially released when disarmament took place were excluded from the DDR programmes.

In general terms, the focus within most DDR programmes on ex-combatants, missing those who assisted in other roles in the war effort, inevitably brings with it a gender bias. First, women are generally involved as couriers, cooks, nurses and traditional healers, and in intelligence, political mobilization, and other paramilitary services. Yet these women usually do not qualify as beneficiaries in DDR programmes because they did not carry arms. Further, by focusing on those bearing arms, DDR programmes effectively reward those who fought and not those who kept others alive.

Gender-based violence

The relevant UN Security Council resolutions emphasize gender-based violence alongside participation in post-conflict countries. Gender-based violence is also an issue that emerges as key in several of the reports. While gender-based violence is a problem in virtually all countries and regions, the case study reports highlight how the conflicts affected the prevalence and nature of the violence.

The Timor-Leste report describes how women suffered violence while participating in resisting the Indonesian occupation. Many were separated from their menfolk and suffered rape and sexual abuse at the hands of their Indonesian captors. Forced family planning was also introduced, particularly for the wives of civil servants. Rejection of this forced family planning programme continues to contribute to today’s high fertility rate, while cultural practices related to marriage exchange continue to contribute to violence against women in the post-conflict period.

In Timor-Leste, UNFPA, with support from Irish Aid and after consultation with Timorese women, established a budget for a multi-year programme on gender-based violence that was still receiving support almost a decade later. Activities that aim to protect
women from violence and sexual abuse are also provided for in the joint UN programme funded by the UNDP-Spain Millennium Development Goal Achievement Fund. In November 2008, the Government of Australia released the report ‘Violence against Women in Melanesia and East Timor’. At the time the research was undertaken, Australia was working with local and regional stakeholders to develop programmes to address the findings of the report.

During the war in Southern Sudan, daughters became economic bargaining chips, escalating forced and early marriage, rape within marriage and domestic violence. This combined with the idea that child-bearing was a patriotic obligation, resulted in many men having a sense of entitlement to sexual services whether inside or outside marriage.

In terms of funding for this issue, the UNDP Access to Justice project supports legal assistance centres to ensure that the rights of vulnerable groups—particularly women— are safeguarded. Presumably, this project could provide a route for support to women with respect to gender-based violence. UNDP and UNFPA have also supported the establishment of special protection units in police stations to handle rape and other instances of gender-based violence.

The Sierra Leone report notes that the concept of sexual violence as a crime was not well rooted in the country from the start. The report gives details of the multiple horrific forms that sexual violence assumed during the conflict. However, it argues that “shocking as it was, the violence that occurred against women during the war was merely a descent along an established trajectory.”

The Sierra Leone report has the most examples of funding of gender-based violence initiatives, spanning almost a decade. For example, in the early 2000s when the peace process had deteriorated, the United States earmarked $250,000 for sexual and gender-based violence run by the International Rescue Committee, and $725,000 for gynaecological surgery through the International Medical Corps. In a later period, as part of the reparations programme, monies from the UN Peacebuilding Fund were used to assist 235 women victims of gender-based violence in respect of fistula surgery and other medical treatments. UNDP and DFID currently support Family Support Units in police stations to handle cases of gender-based violence. In addition, UNFPA has committed $1 million over three years to about 650 women who were victims of sexual violence for micro-grants, skills training, and to raise community awareness on accountability for gender-based violence. UNFPA provides direct support to NGOs that assist victims of gender-based violence.

In Kosovo, local women’s rights organizations were supported by international donors such as the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society Women’s Programme, Kvinna Till Kvinna, Oxfam and the Star Network alongside UNIFEM and UNDP in their efforts to combat violence against women. Support focused on activities such as establishing safe houses, awareness-raising conferences, advocacy campaigns and research.

Recently, UNDP provided support for gender-based violence issues through the two-year Women’s Safety and Security Project within its Justice and Security Programme. The funds have helped establish and equip interview rooms for survivors of trafficking and domestic violence in six regional police stations. The follow-up Women’s Safety and Security Initiative 2009–2011 programme provides for support to the Agency for Gender Equality in drafting the Law on Domestic Violence and developing the Action Plan for Combating Domestic Violence. In addition, institutional grants supported five shelters for women victims of violence.

The Kosovo report highlights trafficking as a specific form of gender-based violence. It notes that the presence of a large, comparatively wealthy and primarily male international presence in Kosovo immediately after the war resulted in a strong demand for sexual services, which in turn resulted in an increase in the number of women trafficked from both within and beyond Kosovo. International actors such as the International Organisation on Migration and the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe promoted and supported the anti-trafficking efforts of UN agencies and the Kosovo institutions, as well as local and international NGOs. The Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, which came into effect in 2004, defines sex and labour trafficking as criminal acts.

Overall, and perhaps encouraged by the Security Council resolutions, initiatives with respect to gender-based violence have been explicitly supported in post-conflict financing in all four case studies.
PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION

In addition to gender-based violence, the gender-related Security Council resolutions emphasize women’s participation and representation. The case study reports trace the involvement of women during the conflict, through the settlement and post-settlement periods. Women’s roles during conflicts support the argument that women, having contributed during the conflict, should be rewarded in the post-conflict situation. Information on women’s representation in post-conflict legislatures provides an indication as to whether women have an opportunity to participate in budget-related decision-making, at least with respect to the (often limited) government budget. Information on women’s involvement during the settlement and early post-conflict period is most relevant, as it suggests the extent to which women might have been able to influence the assistance provided by UN and other agencies. Unfortunately, while the case study reports tend to have more information on the issue of participation than on many other issues, there is less evidence of women’s involvement in and immediately after the settlement period than in the earlier and later phases. The seemingly limited—or non-existent—engagement of women as a distinct interest group in key events relating to post-conflict financing is particularly noteworthy.

During the transition period in Timor-Leste, about 500 women representatives of Rede Feto (a network of fifteen or so mainly urban women’s organizations) came together in the First Congress of Women of Timor Loro Sa’e. The objective of the Congress was to agree on the most important issues in the reconstruction period.

At the time of the first elections in August 2001, Rede Feto requested that the election regulations include a quota of 30 percent women. The Electoral Affairs Division of the UN Department of Political Affairs rejected this call on the grounds that it was not in accordance with UN standards of free and fair elections. However, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General ensured that some support was provided to women candidates, and women accounted for 27 percent of those elected.

As noted, Rede Feto attended several of the donor meetings. However, it is not clear that it was able to influence the direction of funding.
In **Southern Sudan**, the Netherlands and the New Sudan Council of Churches supported women to engage in informal and formal peace-building processes. The first informal meeting between warring Southern Sudan factions that was organized by the Council of Churches (in 1998), was attended only by men. At the next, larger gathering more than one third of the delegates were women. As a result, clear targets were set that addressed women’s concerns about rights violations.

The more formal processes were spearheaded by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, in which none of the representatives were women. However, in 2002 when the Government of Sudan and the SPLM signed the Machakos Protocol on the role of the state and religion and the right of Southern Sudan to self-determination, women members of the SPLM persuaded the SPLM leader to add two women to the ten-man delegation. Subsequently, several women attended further negotiations. However, the Southern Sudan report notes that the women tended to be marginalized and were often co-opted on such short notice that they could not develop a women’s peace agenda. Women’s groups examined the protocols and sent comments to the SPLM and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, but their comments did not include gender-related comments or recommendations.

After further lobbying by women’s groups, the SPLM delegation included 18 men and six women at the final round of talks. However, there were no women on the negotiating teams or acting as mediators. Women delegates proposed that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement provide for 25 percent participation at all levels of government, in line with the SPLM Constitution. The all-male drafting committee reduced the target to 5 percent, and the quota proposal was subsequently dropped.

Women activists and organizations made concerted efforts to ensure that gender issues were considered in transitional justice processes. The case study report details the efforts and achievements of a specially formed Women’s Task Force, which focused on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Unfortunately, women’s groups were less active in the reparations debate—which is more relevant from a financial perspective—than in the hearings stage.

In **Sierra Leone**, the Women’s Forum was among the first to take up the issue of peace. In 1994 women’s development and religious organizations launched the Sierra Leone Women’s Movement for Peace. This was followed by the 50/50 Group of Sierra Leone, the Campaign for Good Governance, and initiatives by other women’s organizations. Regionally, women from Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea came together in 2000 to establish the regional Mano River Union Peace Network. The Network was subsequently accorded delegate status at the Economic Community of West African States summit, where they delivered a speech on the importance of supporting women’s peacemaking programmes.

Women led massive street demonstrations in Sierra Leone prior to the national consultative conferences that preceded the multi-party elections and return to civilian rule. Using informal diplomacy, women’s organizations helped to shape the peace agenda. Nevertheless, no civil society organizations were invited to the negotiation tables at Abidjan (in 1996) or Lomé (in 1999). Five women were among about twelve civilian observers of the Lomé talks, and the government delegation included one woman who had been specifically selected to speak on violence against women. However, the fact that they had to organize their own accommodation and transport limited their availability for informal lobbying and networking.

In **Kosovo**, only one woman attended the unsuccessful internationally-brokered peace talks held in Rambouillet, France in February and March 1999, and there was no discussion of
women’s issues. During the subsequent UN-backed Kosovo status process negotiations, the Kosovo negotiating team included no women. In the final package of proposals, gender was referred to in a very general manner, and only in the section on human rights and freedoms.

Subsequently, the SRSG appointed an eight-member consultative body, the Interim Administrative Council, to advise him in the period leading up to the democratic elections. This body was composed of four members nominated by the UN, three Kosovo Albanians and one representative of Kosovo Serbs. Initially, the Council did not include a single woman, although a woman served as the Serb National Council’s observer. In response to pressure from local women’s organizations, an additional woman from civil society was appointed as observer. As observers, these women could speak, but not vote. Of the 35 members of the Kosovo Transitional Council, a legislature-style advisory body mandated with representing the views of Kosovo stakeholder groups, six were women drawn from civil society or women politicians.

This suggests that in all four situations examined, organized women played a key role in the settlement period. In some cases they also drew up specific demands related to gender equality or women’s needs. A UNIFEM review (2010b) of a representative sample of 24 major peace processes since 1993 reveals that women were 2.5 percent of signatories, 3.2 percent of mediators and 7.6 percent of negotiators. In the four case studies, women’s demands often related to representation in post-settlement structures, and case study reports record some advances in increasing women’s representation in parliament and/or in local councils. There is, however, little if any evidence of women organizing around or being involved in decision-making around post-conflict financing.

Examination of projects and programmes supported by donors found several examples of support for women’s political representation, concentrated primarily in legislatures. Some focused on encouraging and otherwise assisting women to stand for election; others focused on assisting women, once elected, in understanding their roles and effectively performing with a gender perspective. In Timor-Leste, UNIFEM supported training in respect of gender-responsive budgeting for parliamentarians. In the other case studies, there was no evidence of donor support focused specifically on financing issues.

**Across all countries, organized women played a key role in the settlement period. In some cases they also drew up specific demands related to gender equality or women’s needs.**
RECOMMENDATIONS

The diversity of approaches reported in the case studies underscores the lack of a one-size-fits-all solution for ensuring that post-conflict financing promotes gender equality. Nevertheless, there are patterns that emerge across the four case studies that suggest steps that could help to achieve this outcome.

There are six broad recommendations emerging from the study that are crucial to advancing women’s empowerment and gender equality.

**Finding:** Post-conflict planning, financing and budgeting processes were opaque.

The researchers spent considerable time and effort trying to piece together information about post-conflict financing in each of the four case studies. Despite their efforts, they were not able to present a complete picture. Incompleteness is found in the information even before attempting to analyse processes from a gender perspective, and increases with the addition of the gender dimension.

**Recommendation 1:** Planning, resource mobilization and budgeting processes in the post-conflict context must be made transparent. This includes providing public information through channels that poor women and men can access easily, such as in local languages, via community radio or placing information on public notice boards. The methods used should also take into account women’s and men’s different time use patterns.

**Finding:** Women were under-represented in events and processes, and in decision-making around strategies, that inform and determine planning priorities, related financing and budgets.

Across all cases, there was marked under-representation of women during key events and processes that inform and determine planning priorities and the related financing in peace negotiations, donor pledging conferences, post-conflict needs assessments, development of funding modalities and creation of national development planning and budgeting processes. This finding is evident with respect to the leadership levels that generally engage in these events and processes and to those who are consulted in their development. Even more lacking were the presence and voices of ‘ordinary’ women.

For example, in Kosovo only one woman, participated in the peace talks; in South Sudan although six women were included in the SPLM delegation for the final round of peace talks, no women were on the negotiating teams or acted as mediators; and in
Sierra Leone, despite women activists’ pivotal role in bringing leaders to the pre-Lomé negotiating table, the women were not officially integrated into the peace process.

Donor conferences, with very few exceptions, were held externally (for example, this was the case for the first 5 donor conferences for Timor Leste), which restricted the number and type of local participants.

Where women did participate in either peace talks or donor-pledging conferences, they were not supported in preparing for or engaging in the processes. Nor were they provided access to all conference documentation, space on the agenda to present issues of concern, given decision making responsibility or a formal seat at the negotiating table.

No systematic processes existed in any of the case studies to ensure consultation with women’s groups during mediation, negotiation or in the range of post-conflict planning processes. There was rarely an explicit focus on integrating gender expertise consistently or equitably into post-conflict planning and financing assessments.

**Recommendation 2:** To enhance inclusiveness, ways must be found to ensure adequate women’s representation in peace negotiations and donor pledging conferences. The approaches used need to be adapted to account for the make-up of the delegations in order to ensure that the voices of women of the post-conflict country are heard. In addition, UN-led needs assessments should be mandated to ensure a structured process of consultation with women. Similar processes should be built into national planning and budgeting processes.

In addition, criteria should be established to ensure that those chosen to participate in political processes and consulted on technical processes have standing and can speak knowledgeably on behalf of ordinary women. In considering these criteria, attention should be given to how the representatives are legitimized (e.g., whether they are part of an organized grouping and what their capacities are). In particular, they must be equipped with the skills and knowledge to put forward concrete and feasible proposals at these conferences and meetings. Representatives should be supported to gain these skills.

**Finding:** There was a lack of alignment with national priorities with regard to post-conflict planning, financing and budgeting processes.

Despite the emphasis on harmonization and national control over donor funds following the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, each of the four case studies revealed the existence of a number of different donor funds managed by different agencies—yet often with overlapping scope. In Southern Sudan, for example, by 2009 there were 30 development partners, 376 donor projects (including 248 bilateral projects) and only 128 with pooled funds. In Timor-Leste, 28 bilateral donors were active at some time between 1999 and 2006, but only a third participated in the MTDFs. Of total funding received since 2000, 82 percent has been delivered through bilateral cooperation and only 16 percent through the MTDFs.

This multiplicity hampers coordinated planning and increases the likelihood of duplication and risk of neglecting important issues. The multiplicity also lessens the possibility for the emerging national authority to understand and influence funding and to set its strategies for development. This is in direct contradiction with the Paris Principles, which call for donors to align behind the priorities set within national strategies, to use local systems and for there to be mutual accountability.

The Paris Principles also call for harmonization, whereas the case studies showed varying financial years, reporting formats, and different methods of accounting for technical assistance. This also leads to the risks of double counting (e.g., where one donor channels through another), and makes it difficult to estimate the total funds reaching a country or to determine what funds were supposed to be allocated for and what they were actually used for. In addition, the multiplicity of funds diminishes the potential for consistent approaches to gender mainstreaming.

**Recommendation 3:** The United Nations should take a lead role in ensuring that post-conflict financing is aligned with national priorities (to the extent possible in a transition period) and coordinated in accordance with the Paris Principles. Those relating to national ownership, harmonization, and gender equality are particularly important.
Finding: Gender expertise, gender analysis and gender mainstreaming mechanisms were not consistently integrated into post-conflict resource mobilization or allocation mechanisms.

The study found some evidence in the four case studies of some consideration for gender equity in mobilizing and/or allocating UN-managed funds, including in the appointment of gender experts and the allocation of funding for gender-specific issues. However, there was limited evidence of agreed and required processes for ensuring that resources equitably address the needs of poor women and men in different social categories. In addition, there was no strong evidence of monitoring of the impact of allocations addressing gender inequalities. Instead, consideration of gender differences in resource allocations seems to have been dependent on the presence of an institution or on individuals that paid attention to this issue.

In Southern Sudan, of three new funds administered by the UN since 2008, none were established with the help of gender expertise. In Timor-Leste, no gender specialist was appointed or commissioned to provide advice or review.

Where gender experts were included, they did not, generally, have the expertise to cover all sectors. For example, none of the countries had a gender and economic policy adviser with budget analysis skills.

The current thinking and practice of drawing on generic gender experts is inadequate to comprehensively address gender dimensions across all sectors. The practice of limiting gender experts to the social sectors is also detrimental in this regard.

Recommendation 4: Standard procedures, rules and criteria should be developed and applied by the United Nations to all UN-managed post-conflict, resource mobilization, needs assessment, planning and related processes in order to ensure that gender is fully integrated into all post-conflict funds and sectors. The UN plays a leading role in developing global norms and standards in the fields of human rights, peace and security and development; the procedures, rules and criteria developed by the UN for these sectors can provide guidance and be voluntarily applied by national governments and their development partners, even in the absence of direct requirements to do so.

In developing these procedures, rules and criteria, attention should be given to the principles of transparency, inclusiveness and alignment with national priorities. The procedures, rules and criteria should include:

- A requirement for donor conferences to, where possible, take place in the country emerging from conflict, rather than externally (i.e., in donor countries, United Nations Headquarters);
- A requirement that all post-conflict funding agreements go beyond stating that gender is a cross-cutting issue to include gender mainstreaming outputs/outcomes and indicators that must be subsequently monitored and reported on; and
- A routine requirement that gender expertise be made available for all UN-managed post-conflict resource mobilization processes, needs assessments, planning and related processes. In addition, gender expertise should be included in the management and governance bodies of funding instruments and mechanisms as standard policy.

Finding: Gender machineries were weak and received little support. In some cases they had weak or limited institutional mandates, in others limited political clout, and in all cases weak capacities and inadequate financing.

All four of the case studies examined the gender machineries that exist, and in all four, various institutional weaknesses limited their effectiveness. These weaknesses were:

1. Weak/limited institutional mandates

Some of the gender machineries studied fell short when measured against the mandate for national machineries as outlined in the Platform for Action of the 4th World Conference on Women “to design, promote the implementation of, execute, monitor, evaluate, advocate and mobilize support for policies that promote the advancement of women” (paragraph 196).

With regard to gender policies, while all four case studies found that gender policies existed, they have not necessarily been implemented and there appears to have been limited, if any, attention paid to the question of financing the policies.
2. **Weak capacities and inadequate funding**

All four case studies highlighted the extent to which the respective gender machineries were underfunded. In Kosovo, in 2004, the amount allocated for the Agency for Gender Equality was less than 1 percent of the total central budget and in Sierra Leone, the gender machinery line is still only 1 percent of recurrent expenditures. In Timor Leste, the Office of the Adviser for the Promotion of Equality received no programmatic budget.

Adequate funding, in this context, relates to both the operating costs (staff, administrative) and the cost of activities of the national gender machinery.

3. **Little political clout/non-strategic location within government**

Although the gender machinery in Kosovo had an explicit mandate for gender mainstreaaming, it was not taken seriously. In Sierra Leone, although sound policies on gender mainstreaaming have been developed, they have not translated into action due to a lack of political will. The Ministry of Gender and Children’s Affairs created in 1996 was merged with the Ministry of Social Welfare in 1998.

Conversely, results were achieved where strong leadership existed. In Timor Leste, in 2001, under the leadership of SRSG, Sérgio Vieira de Mello, put in place a number of affirmative action initiatives to promote women’s participation in the elections. The result was that women made up 27 percent of the first Constitutional Assembly.

**Recommendation 5:** There must be national gender machineries within government that have the requisite mandate, funding and capacity, and political clout and leadership to drive gender mainstreaaming. These machineries must be established as early in the post-conflict phase as possible.

Early and priority investments must be made to strengthen national gender machineries’ roles in whatever form is most appropriate for the national context. The machineries should be the key drivers of gender mainstreaaming and women’s empowerment in government processes across all sectors. Investments should cover:

1. **Institutional mandate**

National gender machineries must be given a strong institutional mandate in line with the Beijing Platform for Action.

Such a mandate necessitates the following core functions: setting gender mainstreaaming policy frameworks; analysis, planning and coordination across sectors; building internal capacities for gender mainstreaaming; measuring, monitoring and reporting gender equality impacts; accountability for gender equality results and advocacy; policy research; and piloting new approaches to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment.

A minimum level of core funding should be guaranteed as well as a staffing complement that reflects the capacities needed to mainstream across all sectors. Both funding and capacities must follow and be commensurate with the mandate and associated core functions outlined above. This requires both gender and functional expertise across all sectors.

A good benchmark for this is the funding and capacity given to departments with similar mandates of mainstreaming, planning and coordination, monitoring and evaluating, and ensuring accountability across sectors and departments (e.g., finance, planning and environment departments).

3. **Political clout and leadership**

The national gender machinery must be strategically located within government and given the political clout necessary to addressing the country’s critical gender gaps, and to planning, coordinating, monitoring, evaluating and ensuring accountability across sectors and departments for gender equality. Strong leadership is also crucial. However, an enabling structure must be created to avoid personalization and reliance on individuals.
It should also be clear that the work and functions of the national women’s machineries alone cannot be expected to ensure that gender equality is fully mainstreamed in a country. Rather, all government departments, agencies and institutions must also be held responsible for ensuring that gender equality is fully mainstreamed in their respective work and functions. In this regard, national authorities in all sectors must develop clear guidelines and criteria for budget analysis and for ensuring that allocations benefit men and women and girls and boys equitably.

**Finding:** Post-conflict reconstruction initiatives did not allocate resources to promote gender equality or address women’s needs to any significant degree.

In all contexts, critical gender gaps exist. These gaps can include, for example, girls’ access to education, addressing women’s reproductive health needs, ensuring access to water for domestic consumption, women’s access to agricultural inputs, addressing sexual and gender-based violence, and equal access to economic opportunities.

In the four case studies, the researchers were not able to identify budget lines that adequately addressed key issues related to gender equality to any significant degree. Critical gender gaps were not funded consistently or comprehensively in any of the four case studies (see Box 1).

In all case studies, donors conceived their assistance in the early period as focusing on reconstruction and/or humanitarian assistance, distinct from development, with the hope that later assistance could focus on development.

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**Box 1: Investment in Gender Equality**

**What is ‘adequate’ financing for gender equality?**

Debates about financing for gender equality have included recommendations to focus on specific funding for women and to mainstream funding for gender equality. Some favour both, others argue for one over the other. When specific funding for women is advocated, the debate has centred on whether or not to ring-fence funds, and if ring-fencing is the answer, what percentage of the total budget is adequate?

For example, the Secretary-General’s Report on Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding, recently presented to the Security Council, recommends allocating at least 15 percent of UN-managed funds that support peace-building to projects that address women’s specific needs, advance gender equality and/or empower women as their principle objective.

The research coming out of this synthesis report suggests further thinking is required. Adequate financing for gender equality in any post-conflict context will be specific to the country context and the critical gender gaps faced. Resources must be allocated based on the type/nature of the gender gaps, the scope of the response and the cost of the activities required to close the gaps.

Because of the nature of the gaps and initiatives required to remedy them, the funding necessarily has to be located within sectoral budgets, within mainstream budget lines and in stand-alone gender-specific allocations.

For example, adequate financing to address gender-based violence would need to be included in the sector budgets for health, rule of law institutions (e.g., the police and the judiciary), education, local governments and the security sector, as well as in the budget of the national gender machineries.

Research coming out of MDG costing exercises done for MDG 3 supports this. Estimating costs is essential for prioritizing, planning, and budgeting. However, costs are context specific.

Therefore, while it can be helpful to ring-fence funds for gender equality, in order to benchmark and monitor implementation for accountability, broad based budget targets are an imprecise mechanism. Targets should be based on costing what it will take to close the critical gender gaps in the given context.

**What expertise is needed?**

Along with targeted funding, specialized expertise is needed to close critical gender gaps in post-conflict (and even stable) contexts. Given the sectoral scope of the gender gaps highlighted in this report, it follows that teams of two or three specialists with skills to cover different sectors is needed (e.g., social, economic and infrastructure). Even within sectors there are differentiated specializations. For example, the democratic governance sector requires specific technical expertise in areas such as gender and elections, women’s legal rights, and gender-sensitive public administration and service delivery. The current practice of deploying generic gender experts to inform planning, financing and budgeting processes across the entire range is highly inadequate. One of the largest gaps in expertise is in the area of gender analysis of the economic strategies, policies and infrastructure programmes. Specialized gender expertise on security sector reform is also critical and often absent.

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Accordingly, significant post-conflict resources were allocated to security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and the law and justice sector more generally, as well as to reconstruction and humanitarian needs.

In Southern Sudan, for example, in 2009, 29 percent of the budget was allocated to security and 12 percent to roads, with basic education receiving 7 percent, primary health-care 3 percent, water provision 2 percent and production 2 percent. These top six government-defined budget priorities remained consistent for the previous six years.

**Recommendation 6:** Post-conflict reconstruction initiatives must allocate dedicated resources for promoting gender equality and addressing women’s needs. What is adequate will be specific to each country context, but in all cases resources must be commensurate with the depth of the inequalities, the scope of the response and the cost of the activities required (see Box 1).

Gender mainstreaming must occur in all priority areas across all sectors.

The areas of security sector reform, demobilization, disarmament and repatriation and law and justice should be given particular early attention due to their crucial impact on women’s security and resettlement. In this context, gender mainstreaming does not mean merely including women who have filled roles predominantly played by men (e.g., female ex-combatants). Rather, it must also take into account the different roles that women play in, and how they are affected by, these sectors.

A critical mass of women must participate, and gender analysis must be integrated into all security sector reforms, DDR, and law and justice programming at all stages, and financing must include investments in capacity development. Capacity development should not only focus on those within security-sector institutions, but also should focus on civil society actors, so that the research and policy guidance informed by or based on gender analysis is fully explored and implemented.

Funding for and attention to gender-based violence should be mainstreamed across planning and budgeting in all relevant sectors.
REFERENCES


