This report provides key findings from data collected and matched through list-to-voter and voter-to-list surveys for a voter registration audit of the 2008 photo voter list in Bangladesh. IFES designed and conducted this audit on behalf of UNDP with the cooperation of the Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC) and the Preparation of Electoral Rolls with Photographs (PERP) project. This audit found that data for the voter list have been collected with a high degree of accuracy, and the incidence of non-inclusion of voters who should have been included is very low. Even in cases where eligible voters do not appear on the list, there are adequate reasons that explain their non-inclusion. Data also indicate that Bangladeshis have overwhelmingly positive appraisals of the registration effort and have a high degree of confidence in the accuracy of the voter list—a confidence borne out by the results of this audit. This assessment includes a set of recommendations for conducting data integrity tests of the electronic electoral roll.
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), as part of its project assurance role, commissioned this independent assessment to audit the 2008 photo voter register in Bangladesh to IFES. This assessment was conducted in cooperation with the Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC) and the Preparation of Electoral Rolls with Photographs (PERP) project and with funding provided by the UNDP. This audit was conducted nationwide through the use of list-to-voter and voter-to-list surveys that allowed IFES to assess the accuracy of the information gathered for voters who are on voter list, as well as the completeness of the voter list. Fieldwork for these surveys was conducted from 15 September to 2 November 2008. This research was designed, supervised and analyzed by IFES, and all fieldwork and data-processing was conducted by Survey and Research System (SRS).

A total of 8,000 voters were randomly sampled from the voter list and their information was verified through interviews with the voters themselves or with relatives, neighbors or others who could verify important information about the sampled voters. A total of 3,200 households were contacted for the voter-to-list survey, in which data for 8,954 voting-age adults were captured by interviewers. The list-to-voter survey was designed to draw a representative sample of registered voters from the voter's list in order to check the accuracy of the list, while the voter-to-list sample was designed to be representative of the adult population of Bangladesh in order to gauge the extent to which eligible adults were left off the list.

In the list-to-voter survey, interviewers compared the data listed in the voter list for each sampled voter with information supplied directly by the sampled voter or by someone able to verify information about the sampled voter. Comparison of the two datasets allowed IFES to assess whether the data in the voter list accurately captured key information on individual voters in Bangladesh. In the voter-to-list survey, interviewers obtained key identifying information for every voting-age adult in a sampled household. Data for these voters were then compared with data on the voter list to determine if the voter had been registered during the registration process and, if so, to determine the accuracy of the data captured during the registration process. Data comparisons from these two surveys allowed IFES to assess the quality of the voter list with a high degree of reliability. In addition to these surveys, IFES also conducted an assessment of the database structure utilized for the construction of the voter list.

Analysis of the list-to-voter and voter-to-list surveys indicates that the voter list compiled through the PERP project is highly accurate and does not exhibit signs of systematic under-counting, existence of “ghost voters” or exclusion of specific groups of voters. In comparison with assessment of voter lists created during previous voter registration efforts in Bangladesh, this assessment concludes that the voter list for the December 2008 election has effectively registered the universe of eligible voters in Bangladesh, and accomplished this with a great deal of accuracy in capturing the particulars for individual voters.

The key findings from this assessment include the following:

The data was captured with a high degree of accuracy. The audit matched the name, father’s/husband’s name, date of birth, address, and voter area in the voter list for each sampled voter against information given to interviewers and concluded that the data in the voter list are accurate more than 95 per cent of the time in each case. In most cases where data are not completely accurate, it is either because small spelling mistakes have been made or the person interviewed could not verify the birth date of the sampled voter.
The list includes only legitimate voters. Almost all voters sampled from the 2008 voter list (98 per cent) were found to be living in their recorded address. Among the very few voters who were not living at their recorded address, legitimate reasons were provided for why they were not currently living at that address. No “ghost voters” were found on the 2008 photo voters list. This finding should provide confidence to all electoral stakeholders.

The high accuracy rates were geographically uniform. The audit did not find any major differences in data accuracy for sampled voters between different divisions in the country, or between rural and urban areas. The list was found to be fairly uniform in accuracy, suggesting that the voter registration process was administered evenly throughout the country.

There are no discernible differences by gender in the accuracy of the list. It is notable that the gender and voter area for each sampled voter in the list-to-voter survey were accurately recorded in 100 per cent of cases, and the address of the sampled voter was accurately recorded in 99.4 per cent of cases. The accuracy of these data points is important for ensuring that there are no mix-ups on Election Day as to the voter area in which a person should vote.

Almost all photos are of good quality. Interviewers in both the list-to-voter and voter-to-list surveys were asked to assess the quality of the photos of sampled voters both on their ID card and on the printed list to be used by local election officials on Election Day. In both cases, almost all of the photos were found to be of good quality, sufficient for allowing an election official to identify the voter. This finding should ease concerns about the use of photos as an identification mechanism for the 29 December elections.

Nearly all eligible voters are on the list. The voter-to-list household survey captured information for 8,954 voters. The matching of information from these voters with information on the voter list shows that 99 per cent of sampled voters were accurately recorded on the voter list at their correct address. Of the one per cent of sampled voters who were not found on the voter list, almost all had either moved to their current address after enumeration was completed in that area or were absent or otherwise indisposed during enumeration.

Almost all respondents expressed confidence that voter registration had led to an accurate voter list. Ninety-nine per cent in each survey expressed this opinion. Similar percentages in both surveys also rated the voter registration process positively.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT

Bangladesh’s Ninth Parliamentary Election, scheduled for January 2007, could not be held due to a popular uprising prompted by challenges to the electoral process, particularly emanating from significant inaccuracies in the voter register. One survey estimated that approximately 12.2 million names on the voter register were either in error or duplicates. Several well-respected civil society representatives, academics, development partners and media persons voiced their deep concern over the inaccuracies and anomalies in the voter register. Subsequently, members of the BEC were replaced and a new executive management team was appointed by the caretaker government. A committee of experts, headed by the Vice Chancellor of BRAC University, was constituted to explore the options available with respect to repairing the existing voter list or creating a new list and recommended that a project to generate a new register should be undertaken. Based on their recommendations, the caretaker government decided to prepare a new electoral roll with photographs.

The BEC was tasked with designing and implementing a new electoral process that would lead to parliamentary elections at the end of 2008. The first task was to create a new voter register. The chosen methodology was a complete re-registration leading to a ‘photographic’ voter register with biometric capturing of fingerprints to enable identification of duplicate registrants. The register was developed in a two-step process: door-to-door enumeration to complete voter information forms followed by a visit by the voter to a registration center to have his/her photograph taken and fingerprints scanned. Some commentators felt that this high-tech approach would be too costly and unsustainable, but it was supported during the planning phase as being the only way for Bangladesh to re-establish a register that would be credible to the people and political contenders alike.

Development partners, after consultation with the government and the BEC, agreed to provide financial support for the project. The approximate cost of the project was US$ 80 million, funded jointly by the Government of Bangladesh and various development partners, including Denmark, European Commission, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the UNDP.

The voter registration project had two main ambitious objectives:

- Creating a credible and acceptable voter register with photographs and fingerprints to conduct the Ninth Parliamentary Election and local elections.
- Establishing a system to allow voters to review and update their registration details.

The project maintained an ambitious timetable, which included designing the methodology, conducting a pilot exercise, procuring 10,000 sets of field registration equipment (including laptops, webcams and fingerprint scanners), nationwide registration, printing draft voter lists, verifying the information on the list and printing the final voter lists within approximately sixteen months. The project electronically registered over eighty million voters in Bangladesh in about eleven months and provided voters with a provisional identity card, which served as an incentive to come to the registration center.

In addition, the electronic database created by this project will be the foundation for the future national identification system and can facilitate birth and death registration. The BEC and project officials will work with the relevant agency/authority designated by the government to issue national ID cards to transfer the current and future updated data. They will also share the voter registry database with different Local Government Institutions to facilitate birth and death registration.
As a result of the project, the BEC has been able to re-establish the electoral institution’s credibility. It has successfully completed voter registration activities and has provided competent and unbiased communication.

In its supporting role to the BEC and the voter registration program, UNDP Bangladesh decided to evaluate the new voter register and selected IFES to assess the quantitative and qualitative accuracy of the data that had been collected so far. On 1 July 2008, UNDP Bangladesh and IFES signed a contract for assessment of the voter list in Bangladesh.
III. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE VOTER REGISTRATION OPERATION

The new electoral roll was designed and implemented by the BEC, with logistical support from the Bangladesh Army and financial assistance from international donors. It was intended to capture the entire population of Bangladeshi citizens that would be eligible to vote in December 2008. A total of 81,032,456 voters were registered between July 2007 and August 2008, of which 41,244,820 were female and 39,787,636 were male.

Creation of a new electoral roll is the most expensive and time-consuming operation that an electoral authority can undertake before any election. Developing and maintaining an accurate voter register and producing a reliable voter list for an election is a complex exercise. There are three commonly used options for voter registration: periodic registration, continuous registration, and a voter list extracted from a civil register. In Bangladesh, it was decided to create a completely new electoral roll, not using any data from the voter register existing in January 2007. Furthermore, in addition to generating a new electoral roll, the BEC would have to continue voter registration from January 2009, with election offices at the upazila level maintaining and updating the electoral roll throughout the year.

One aspect of the new electoral roll that was intensely debated among stakeholders was the identification of voters and whether the project should include the production of a national ID card, a voter ID card, or an electoral roll with photographs. The decision was made to produce an electoral roll with photographs along with the production of a provisional national ID card. For voting purposes, the voter's photograph in the voter list would be sufficient proof of identity, with no need to present the provisional national ID card as an identity document. Offering an ID card gave the public an incentive to visit a center and wait on line to have their photograph and fingerprints taken. The idea of incorporating a provisional national ID card in the new registration project is seen as an initial step towards a future national ID card.

In August 2008, the Government of Bangladesh, the BEC, and UNDP signed an agreement to cooperate on the project for Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs (PERP). The PERP office was established with the purpose of implementing all operational aspects related to the creation of the new electoral roll with photographs under the supervision of the BEC. UNDP provided fund administration, donor coordination, procurement and project assurance services.

Selection of the registration personal including enumerators, data-entry operators, and data collection officers was done by electoral officials, with the assistance from the Bangladesh Army when needed. Training packages were designed and implemented by the Electoral Training Institute (ETI) and the Bangladesh Army. Almost half a million ad hoc staff participated in registration: 311,078 enumerators, 104,025 data-entry operators, 62,069 supervisors, and 5,708 assistant registration officers.

Methodology for voter registration

The registration process had two points of contact with registrants. The first was a door-to-door visit by enumerators to deliver registration forms. Enumerators were usually local school teachers or other community members and often had previous enumeration experience with the BEC and the Government. The second was at registration centers where each voter's registration form was processed and biodata captured. Registration centers were opened in jails and hospitals to provide an opportunity for all eligible voters to register. The door-to-door exercise helped to ensure the registration of women as well as the elderly, disabled and sick, and allowed enumerators to facilitate in the
completion of individual registration forms. Enumerators were each assigned between 300–400 households. Registration forms were distributed to citizens who would be eligible to vote in December 2008 before registration centers were opened in their area. Household members were given a date and time to visit a registration center. If someone was unable to visit the registration center (e.g., because they were elderly, disabled or sick), a mobile registration team of data-entry operators was dispatched.

During the registration period, voters visited their assigned registration center at the time appointed by enumerators. Registration forms were checked, data-entry operators entered the data from the forms into their laptops, photograph and fingerprints of each voter were captured digitally using a webcam and fingerprint scanner.

Data-entry operators returned to the upazila BEC office on completion of data collection for each voting area. All data were uploaded to the upazila election server, where a first data-crosscheck was implemented to identify potential double registration at the upazila level. When all data for a voting area was successfully uploaded to the upazila server, a draft voter list was printed for the voter area. The draft voter list was then displayed in the voting area for a verification period, giving voters the opportunity to verify and correct data or challenge the right of other voters to register. Finally, data collected during the verification period were incorporated into the voter list, and provisional ID cards were printed and distributed through the upazila BEC office for all voters in the voter area.

DVDs with data captured at the upazila level were uploaded on to a central database at the Central Data Center in Dhaka.
IV. SURVEY METHODOLOGY FOR AUDIT

IFES was contracted by UNDP Bangladesh in July to conduct an audit of the new voter list, with the following four goals:

- Determine the extent to which there might be voters on the voter list who are not to be found at the address recorded on the voter list.
- Determine the extent to which eligible voters might have not have been registered during the registration process.
- Determine the rate of accuracy of the data contained in the voter list.
- Assess public opinion on the voter registration process and accuracy of the voter list.

IFES utilized a combination of standard voter audit methodology and public opinion survey methodology to accomplish these goals. As a first step, IFES initiated a competitive process to select a Bangladeshi survey firm to conduct the fieldwork and data-processing for the research. Through this process, Survey and Research System (SRS) based in Dhaka was selected.

IFES decided to implement two separate surveys in systematically sampled locations throughout Bangladesh.

List-to-voter survey: In this survey, 50 voters were randomly sampled from each of 160 sampled upazila throughout Bangladesh, giving a sample size of 8,000 respondents. SRS interviewers obtained the voter list for these locations from upazila BEC offices, located the sampled voters, recorded key data for these voters, and then matched the data against the data found on the voter list. This survey helped IFES determine the extent to which only legitimate voters had been registered during voter registration, and the accuracy of the data collected for these voters.

Voter-to-list survey: In this survey, interviewers sampled 20 households in each of the sampled upazila. Interviewers then obtained data on all eligible individuals in these 3,200 households, giving a sample size of 8,954 respondents. SRS interviewers obtained the voter lists for these sampled locations and used them to match voters in sampled households to those on the list.

In addition to voter information, the surveys were also designed to capture the opinion of voters on the voter registration process. Data from both surveys were processed by SRS, and then analyzed by IFES to compile this report of findings.

Sampling
The list-to-voter survey was designed to draw a representative sample of registered voters, while the voter-to-list sample was designed to be representative of the adult population of Bangladesh. PERP provided IFES with a list that contained all upazila/city corporations/union councils in the country along with the number of registered voters in these locations. This list was current as of late July 2008. IFES used this list as the population basis on which to design the sample for the survey. The number of interviews and households in each division were divided proportionally to the registered voter population in each division, according to the PERP database. Figure 1 outlines the proportion of registered voter population in each division.
Figure 1: Proportion of registered voter population by division (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Proportion of registered voter population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barisal</td>
<td>5.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chittagong</td>
<td>18.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhaka</td>
<td>32.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khulna</td>
<td>11.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajshahi</td>
<td>24.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylhet</td>
<td>6.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because the design called for 50 voters and 20 households in each sampled location, the number of interviews assigned to each division was not exactly in proportion to the registered voter population. Weighting was applied to the data during analysis for both surveys to bring the data into the correct divisional proportion. The total number of sampling points for each division was as follows: Barisal (11), Chittagong (29), Dhaka (51), Khulna (19), Rajshahi (40), and Sylhet (10).

After the number of sampling points had been assigned to each division, the sample used a three-stage design. The first two stages were used to select the exact sampling points for both surveys. In the first stage, upazilas were selected in each division using sampling proportional to population. In the second state, 160 villages (mahallas) were then selected at random by SRS from the selected upazila. With a view to maintaining a balanced urban–rural representation, 42 urban areas (upazila headquarters) and 118 rural upazilas were selected for the survey.

The third stage differed for the two surveys. For the list-to-voter survey, SRS interviewers obtained a copy of the voter list for the selected village/mahalla from the upazila BEC office. Interviewers were trained to select 27 men and 27 women from the voter list using an interval and random starting point in the list. Only 25 men and 25 women were interviewed. The other two were kept as reserves in case a voter could not be located. In the final sample, substitution was needed for only two per cent of cases.

For the voter-to-list survey, SRS interviewers used a walking pattern to select 20 households in sampled locations. Interviewers were trained to develop an interval for the selection of households by dividing the total number of households in the location by 25. Five extra households were included in the walking pattern in case originally sampled households could not be interviewed. In areas with more than 500 households, the area was divided into the number of equal sections necessary to ensure that no more than 500 households occupied any one section, and then one section of the area was randomly sampled for interviews.

During analysis, data were weighted to bring them into line with the proportion of registered voters in each division. Both the realized and weighted samples had a rural/urban breakdown of 74/26 for both the list-to-voter and voter-to-list surveys. Projections for the current population in Bangladesh generally place the rural/urban population proportion in the 75/25–74/26 range, so the decision was made not to weight for rural/urban distribution.
Matching
Matching of data for the voter-to-list survey was conducted in Dhaka after completed questionnaires for a particular area had been sent to the central SRS office. PERP provided office space to IFES and SRS to conduct the matching using voter lists provided by PERP.

Trained SRS personnel conducted the matching. If non-matches were found, they were noted for follow-up by these personnel. In cases of non-match, follow-up visits were conducted by interviewers at the appropriate locations to determine the reason for non-match. These reasons were noted and the questionnaires then returned to Dhaka for data entry.

Data-processing
SRS conducted all data-processing using trained personnel. SRS used double-entry data-processing to ensure 100 per cent accuracy of the dataset. One set of data-entry operators entered all data from the questionnaires for sampled household of all sampled areas. The same questionnaires were also entered by another set of data-entry operators. Then the two sets of entered data were compared item-by-item to detect differences. If any differences were discovered, the data point was verified from the questionnaire and finally accepted.

Quality control
SRS and IFES personnel conducted extensive quality control of all field and data-processing operations through regular visits to the field and verification of completed questionnaires. More than 15 per cent of all completed questionnaires were verified by SRS. SRS supervisors kept in constant contact with interviewers through cell phones and checked on progress of fieldwork. Difficulties, if any, were discussed and resolved, also by phone. No significant difficulties were encountered during fieldwork.
V. VOTER DATA VERIFICATION FROM LIST-TO-VOTER SURVEY

Analysis of data from the list-to-voter survey indicates that almost all voters on the voter list were registered at the address where they currently live. Furthermore, of the small percentage of voters on the list who were not found at the address registered, most had either moved from the address since the enumeration or had registered at their ancestral or seasonal address. Analysis finds that key data on the voter list has been captured with a high degree of accuracy. There are no significant differences by division or gender in accuracy of the voter list. More than nine in 10 voters had already received their ID card at the time of the survey.

Verification of sampled voters

Interviewers were instructed to go to the residences of sampled voters as listed in the voter register to verify voter information. Of the 8,000 voters sampled, 98 per cent were found to be living in their registered address at the time of the survey. Of the remaining two per cent who were not living in their registered address at the time of the survey, several legitimate reasons were given for their non-residence. In most cases, the sampled voter had moved to a different address. In a few cases, the registered address was the ancestral residence of the voter but he/she did not live there permanently, or the voter lived at the address only seasonally.

After establishing whether the voter was in residence, the interviewers were next tasked with confirming important pieces of data about the voter that were captured during voter registration. In cases where the voter was not present, interviewers asked the voter’s relatives or other acquaintances to verify the absent voter’s information. Of the 8,000 voters initially sampled, interviewers verified information on the voter register with the voter himself/herself in 78 per cent of cases. Where the voter was not present, his/her information was verified by a relative or member of the household in 17 per cent of cases, by a neighbor in two per cent of cases, and by another acquaintance in 1.5 per cent of cases.

In 1.5 per cent of cases, the information for the sampled voter could not be verified by anyone. In most of these cases, this was because the voter no longer lived at the registered address (for the reasons cited above) and no one could be found by the interviewer to verify the absent voter’s information. Thus, the data presented below are based on the 7,880 voters whose information could be confirmed either by the voter himself/herself or by a relative or other acquaintance.

Almost all respondents issued photo ID cards

Interviewers were instructed to inquire whether the ID card for the sampled voter had been received. Data indicate that the ID card had been distributed to, and received by, 92.1 per cent of voters in the list-to-voter sample at the time of the survey. In another 1.2 per cent of cases, voters reported that the ID card had been issued but that they had not yet picked up (Figure 2).
There were some regional differences in whether voters in a particular division had received their ID card. Figure 3 indicates that while all or almost all voters contacted in Barisal and Chittagong had received their ID card, voters in Rajshahi, Sylhet, and Dhaka were slightly less likely to have received their ID card. It should be noted that this trend existed at the time the survey, and does not necessarily mean that these differences are now still evident.

**Figure 3: Issuance of ID cards by region (percentage)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Barisal</th>
<th>Chittagong</th>
<th>Dhaka</th>
<th>Khulna</th>
<th>Rajshahi</th>
<th>Sylhet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received ID card</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not receive</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issued but not received</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received but cannot find</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Almost all sampled photos on the voter list found to be of good quality**

With the prior agreement of the BEC and PERP, interviewers were able to photocopy the pages of the voter list on which information for sampled voters was listed. This information was used to match the data collected for each voter in the field. Interviewers were also asked to assess whether the photo of the sampled voter on the voter list was of good quality so that the voter could be identified by looking at this photo. *In 99.7 per cent of cases in which the interview was conducted with the voter himself/herself, the photo was found to be of good quality.*

This indicates that in almost all cases, local polling officials should not have difficulty in identifying voters as they come to polling stations to vote in the December election.
Voter-to-list data indicate list is highly accurate

Data obtained from sampled voters were matched against data on the voter list to determine the accuracy of the voter list. Interviewers specifically matched the following sets of data from the voter list: ID number, name, father’s/husband’s name, gender, birth date, birth month, birth year, voter area, and address.

Findings indicate that data on the voter list are highly accurate (Figure 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST ITEM</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
<th>Spelling error</th>
<th>Incorrect/ different</th>
<th>Incomplete/ partial</th>
<th>Cannot be confirmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ID number</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s/husband’s name</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth date</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth month</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth year</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>&lt;0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>&lt;0.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter area</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4 shows the percentage of cases in which each of the items that was verified by interviewers were either correct, had spelling errors, were incorrect or different, were incomplete or partial, or could not be confirmed. It indicates that information for sampled voters was almost always correct.

The survey found that 98.4 per cent of sampled voters had their name correctly recorded on the voters’ register, while 0.6 per cent had spelling mistakes. In only 0.1 per cent of cases were names recorded substantially incorrect.

Furthermore, gender and voter area were recorded correctly for 100 per cent of sampled voters, and the address was correctly recorded for 99.4 per cent of sampled voters. These pieces of information are critical for ensuring that voters are able to exercise their right to vote; the high rate of accuracy in the voter list is encouraging for the electoral process in Bangladesh.

One area in which the voter list was slightly less accurate was information on the voter’s birth date. The birth date was correct in 95.8 per cent of cases, the birth month was accurate in 96 per cent of cases, and the birth year was accurate in 95.9 per cent of cases. This is probably because many Bangladeshis cannot recall the specific date on which they were born and information is often given for an approximate date on which the voter is considered to have been born.
The ID number was correctly recorded in almost all of cases that could be verified. This number was matched against the ID card of the sampled voter. The ID number could not be confirmed in cases where the voter did not have their ID card available.

**Not much difference in accuracy of voter list between divisions**

Comparison across the six divisions reveals that there is little difference in the accuracy of data on the voter list. The differences that do occur are mainly because in certain divisions there was a disproportionate number of interviews with neighbors or other acquaintances of sampled voters who could not confirm all of the data for a particular voter. The differences do not result from any loss of accuracy in any one division.

Analysis also indicates that there was not much difference between the accuracy of various data points among voters from the six divisions (Figure 5). In each division, the voter’s name was found to be correct in 97 per cent or more of cases. The lowest percentage was in Dhaka, where 97.1 per cent of voters’ names were recorded correctly. However, in two per cent of cases, correct spelling of the voter’s name could not be confirmed because data verification was conducted by a neighbor of the sampled voter. In all divisions, there are very few instances of names that were recorded incorrectly or incompletely. Spelling errors were more common but even instances of these errors were observed in less than one per cent of cases in five of the six divisions.

**Figure 5: Accuracy of data for sampled voters, voter’s name (percentage)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST ITEM</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
<th>Spelling error</th>
<th>Incorrect/different</th>
<th>Incomplete/partial</th>
<th>Cannot be confirmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dhaka</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajshahi</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chittagong</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khulna</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylhet</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barisal</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The name of the father or husband of a sampled voter was found to have been recorded correctly in almost all cases in all six divisions (Figure 6). The highest accuracy was in Sylhet, where the father’s or husband’s name was captured correctly in 99.4 per cent of cases, and the lowest percentage was in Dhaka, where this percentage was 95.9 per cent. Nearly two per cent of cases in Dhaka were characterized by a wrong spelling, and in another 1.7 per cent of cases the father’s or husband’s name could not be confirmed because data verification was conducted by a neighbor of the sampled voter.
Regarding the birth date of the sampled voter, in instances where the interview was conducted with the voter himself/herself the birth date was found to be correct in almost all cases (Figures 7 to 9). In some cases, the sampled voter’s information was verified by a neighbor who did not have detailed knowledge of the voter’s birth date. Therefore, a small percentage of birth dates in each division could not be confirmed. This was highest in Dhaka and Barisal. Nevertheless, the fact that the birth date was recorded correctly in cases where the voter was present for the interview suggests that this information has largely been captured correctly on the voter list.
Figure 8: Accuracy of data for sampled voters, birth month (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST ITEM</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
<th>Spelling error</th>
<th>Incorrect/different</th>
<th>Incomplete/partial</th>
<th>Cannot be confirmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dhaka</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajshahi</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chittagong</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khulna</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylhet</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barisal</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: Accuracy of data for sampled voters, birth year (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST ITEM</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
<th>Spelling error</th>
<th>Incorrect/different</th>
<th>Incomplete/partial</th>
<th>Cannot be confirmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dhaka</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>&lt;0.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajshahi</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chittagong</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khulna</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylhet</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barisal</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An important indicator of the accuracy of the voter list is that, with the exception of the Chittagong division, more than 99 per cent of addresses of sampled voters were recorded correctly (Figure 10). In Chittagong, 98.5 per cent of addresses were recorded correctly, while 0.8 per cent had essentially the correct address but were misspelled. Recording of the correct address for a voter ensures that the voter will be able to vote at the appropriate polling station on Election Day, and the high degree of accuracy of the voter list is a positive for the voter registration process. Spelling errors are not likely to prevent a registered voter from voting on Election Day.
In addition to the voter’s address being recorded correctly, it is important that voters are assigned to the correct voting area for Election Day. The survey found that 100 per cent of sampled voters in each division were assigned to the correct voter area. The survey also found that the gender of all sampled voters was recorded correctly on the voter list in each division (Figures 11 and 12).

**Figure 10: Accuracy of data for sampled voters, address (percentage)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST ITEM</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
<th>Spelling error</th>
<th>Incorrect/different</th>
<th>Incomplete/partial</th>
<th>Cannot be confirmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dhaka</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajshahi</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chittagong</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khulna</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylhet</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barisal</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 11: Accuracy of data for sampled voters, voter area (percentage)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST ITEM</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
<th>Spelling error</th>
<th>Incorrect/different</th>
<th>Incomplete/partial</th>
<th>Cannot be confirmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dhaka</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajshahi</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chittagong</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khulna</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylhet</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barisal</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 12: Accuracy of data for sampled voters, gender (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST ITEM</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
<th>Spelling error</th>
<th>Incorrect/different</th>
<th>Incomplete/partial</th>
<th>Cannot be confirmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dhaka</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajshahi</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chittagong</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khulna</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylhet</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barisal</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interviewers were able to verify whether the ID number for a voter was correctly recorded by comparing the number on the voter list to the number on a voter's ID card. Since not all voters had received their ID card at the time of the survey, there were some differences between divisions in the percentage of ID numbers that were verified as being correct (Figure 13). The ID cards of more than 10 per cent of voters in Dhaka, Rajshahi, and Sylhet were not available (owing either to ID cards not being received or not being available at the time of the interview). In Chittagong and Barisal, almost all sampled voters had their ID cards and almost all of these ID cards were verified as having the same ID number for the voter as on the voter list.

Figure 13: Accuracy of data for sampled voters, ID number (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST ITEM</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
<th>Spelling error</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>--</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajshahi</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chittagong</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khulna</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylhet</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barisal</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No discernible gender differences in accuracy of voter list data

Analysis indicates that there is little difference on the voter list in the accuracy of data for male and female voters. This suggests that women have not been put at risk of disenfranchisement during the voter registration activities. As an illustration of this, survey data for capturing of the voter’s name and father’s/husband’s name are presented in Figures 14 and 15. Both figures illustrate that there is little difference in the accuracy of the data captured for men and women. This trend also holds true for other items verified during the survey.
### Figure 14: Accuracy of data for sampled voters, voter’s name (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST ITEM</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
<th>Spelling error</th>
<th>Incorrect/different</th>
<th>Incomplete/partial</th>
<th>Cannot be confirmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 15: Accuracy of data for sampled voters, father’s/husband’s name (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST ITEM</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
<th>Spelling error</th>
<th>Incorrect/different</th>
<th>Incomplete/partial</th>
<th>Cannot be confirmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VI. VOTER DATA VERIFICATION FROM VOTER-TO-LIST SURVEY

The voter-to-list household survey verified that almost all eligible voters have been registered during the registration process. Most of the small percentage of sampled voters who were not found on the voter list had either moved to their current address after enumeration had been completed or were away from their address when enumeration took place. Key data for sampled voters were captured with a high degree of accuracy on the voter list. More than nine in 10 sampled voters had received their ID card and its photo was found to be of good quality.

In each location in which the survey took place, interviewers randomly sampled 20 households using a systematic procedure and asked a member of the household (in most cases, the head of household) to list the members of the household they believed to be registered at the address. Key data for each person believed to be registered (name, husband's/father's name, gender, year of birth, and address) were recorded by the interviewers and then brought back to Dhaka for comparison with the voter list. In cases where a sampled voter was not found on the voter list, the voter was provisionally listed as not found and further investigation of reasons why they might not be listed was conducted through repeat visits to the field.

Of all voting-age adults whose information was captured during the household survey, 98 per cent were registered at the address where the interview took place. In two per cent of cases, it was reported that the person was not registered at that address for the following reasons (n = 181).

- Person not interested in registering (47 per cent)
- Household not visited by enumerator (28 per cent)
- Mentally unbalanced (11 per cent)
- Failed to be photographed (five per cent)
- Other (nine per cent)

Of non-registered sampled household members, nearly half did not register to vote because they were not interested in being registered. These voting-age adults are not included in the analysis below regarding the effectiveness of the voter list in capturing eligible adults because these individuals voluntarily placed themselves outside the register. The analysis below is based on adults who were reported as being registered as well as those who were reported as not being registered through some extenuating circumstance. The total number of this sample is 8,954 adults.

Most voters found on the voter list, and adequate explanations exist for those not found on the voter list

Comparison of data captured from sampled voters in the field with data on the voter list shows that almost all voters were registered at the correct address on the voter list. Analysis found that 98.1 per cent of voters in the household sample were on the voter list; however, there were spelling errors in the name of the voter in 0.9 per cent of cases. In 1.1 per cent of cases, the sampled voter was not found on the voter list (Figure 16).
Assessment of the Voters’ List in Bangladesh

Project funded by United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Bangladesh
Contract BGD/07/002 - PERP

Figure 16: Results of matching household data (percentage)

Voters who were not found on the voter list were initially listed as non-matches. Interviewers then revisited the areas in which non-matches occurred to try to determine why these voters were not on the voter list. These revisits identified a number of reasons why a particular voter was not found on the voter list (Figure 17).

Figure 17: Reasons for voters not being on the voter list (percentage, n = 95)

Figure 17 indicates that, for most cases, the voter was either absent during enumeration or the voter moved into the household after enumeration. Voters that did not manage to register during enumeration will not be able to vote during the December 2008 election, but they will be able to register for future
elections starting in January 2009 at their respective upazila BEC office. In a few cases, the voter failed to be photographed and did not make it on to the voter list and, in some cases, the voter was not on the voter list for other reasons such as not been age eligible. *Overall this data seems to indicate that most people not found on the voter list were not there for legitimate reasons and not because of systematic negligence during the course of voter registration activities.*

**Information on voter list is highly accurate**

For voting-age adults who were registered, voter information was matched with data on the voter list. This matching reveals that data on the voter list are highly accurate and generally match information reported by the voter (Figure 18). The father’s or husband’s name was correct in nearly 96.8 per cent of cases; in the remaining 3.2 per cent of cases, the names were misspelled. The year of birth was accurately recorded in more than 99.2 per cent of cases, and was incorrect in 0.8 per cent of cases. Given the lack of knowledge among many Bangladeshis of their date of birth, the low incidence of incorrect year of birth is an encouraging measure for the accuracy of the list. The gender and address of the voter were correct in 100 per cent of cases.

**Figure 18: Accuracy of voter data from household survey (percentage)**

![Figure 18](image)

**Little regional difference in capturing eligible adults on voter list**

Given that national data show that very few eligible adults have not been included in the voter list, it is not surprising that survey data show little variation between the six divisions. In each division, sampled voters were found in 98 per cent or more of cases (Figure 19). In each division, those not found on the voter list were primarily people who were absent or otherwise indisposed during enumeration or who had moved to their current address after enumeration was completed.
Analysis was also conducted on rural/urban differences in the percentage of eligible voters found on the voter list. Figure 20 shows that there is no difference in the percentage of rural and urban eligible voters found on the voter list, and that this trend also holds true for those living in city corporations.
Eligible voters of both genders and all age groups captured effectively on voter list

Assessment of sample data by gender and age group indicates that there was no systematic under-representation of any gender or age group on the voter list. Almost all eligible voters of both genders and all age groups were found to have been accurately captured on the voter list (Figures 21 and 22).

Figure 21: Comparison of gender data for eligible adults on voter list (percentage)

![Bar Chart](chart1.png)

Eligible voters aged 18–25 years are least likely to be found on the voter list; however, even in this category, 98.5 per cent of voters were found. The high percentage of eligible voters found on the voter list for each age group and for both genders indicates that voter registration activities were effective in informing all segments of society of the procedures for registration and following through effectively on these procedures.

Figure 22: Comparison of age group data on percentage of eligible adults on voter list

![Bar Chart](chart2.png)
More than nine in 10 voter ID cards already distributed

As in the list-to-voter survey, more than nine in 10 voters whose information was recorded during the household survey had received their ID cards: 93.7 per cent of voters had received their ID card, and 6.3 per cent had not.

Analysis of ID card data by division reveals that voters registered in Rajshahi were less likely to have received their ID cards than voters in other divisions (Figure 23).

Almost all respondents in Chittagong had received their ID card, and this percentage was also very high in Barisal. In Rajshahi, 87.8 per cent had received their ID card, slightly lower than the national average. The discrepancy between divisions may reflect logistical challenges in delivering ID cards, especially in light of the severe flooding that impacted Bangladesh during August to September 2008. Nevertheless, in view of the amount of time available between the end of the survey fieldwork and the December 2008 election, it is expected that almost all voters should have received their ID card in time for the election.

During the household survey, 91 per cent of sampled voters were able to produce their ID card for the interviewer. In addition to recording data from the ID card, interviewers were also asked to assess the quality of the ID card’s photo. In almost all cases where the ID card was available (99.6 per cent), the quality of the photo was found to be good—a result similar to that obtained in the list-to-voter survey. This finding further indicates that polling station workers should have little difficulty in being able to identify voters from their photo on Election Day.
VII. OPINIONS ON AND EXPERIENCES WITH VOTER REGISTRATION ACTIVITIES

The vast majority of Bangladeshis had received some information about voter registration before enumerators visited their households at the start of the registration process. Television, radio, and local officials were the most widely used sources of information for the voter registration process. Respondents to the household survey reported in almost every case that election officials had followed the proscribed registration procedures. More than 99 per cent of respondents in both the list-to-voter and voter-to-list surveys had confidence in the accuracy of the voter list and gave positive evaluations of the voter registration process.

In the list-to-voter survey, 7,880 respondents provided data and opinion on their voter registration experiences, while in the voter-to-list survey one person in each sampled household (3,200 respondents) provided information. Data for each survey are presented separately below.

Most people were aware of voter registration activities before the start of enumeration

In the voter-to-list survey, respondents were asked whether they had received any information about voter registration before an enumerator visited their household. Ninety-five per cent of respondents said that they had heard something about voter registration before an enumerator visited their household. More than 90 per cent respondents of both sexes and in every age group reported that they had heard something about voter registration. The same trend was observed in every division as well as in both rural and urban areas. The fact that almost all respondents had heard something about voter registration activities before enumeration began is a crucial factor in the high quality and accuracy of the voter list observed in this audit. In order for successful registration to take place, not only did PERP and the BEC have to implement effective procedures to register all eligible adults but voters themselves had to be motivated to take part in the registration process.

Respondents who reported having heard about voter registration activities before enumeration began were asked what sources of information they had used to obtain this information. Data indicate that television was by far the most common source of information. Community leaders, radio, newspapers/magazines, and posters were also used by a significant percentage of respondents. However, there were differences in the frequency of use of these sources by rural and urban respondents (Figure 24).
Figure 24 shows that television was the most used source for information in both rural and urban areas, but that urban respondents used television at a much higher rate than rural respondents (87 per cent versus 65 per cent). Rural respondents were more likely to use the radio than urban respondents (34 per cent versus 25 per cent). These trends probably reflect patterns of access to television and radio in rural and urban areas.

More than four in 10 respondents in both rural and urban areas learned about voter registration activities through a local community leader. Many respondents in both rural and urban areas also reported using other local information sources such as neighbors, teachers, etc. These findings reflect the importance of word-of-mouth in transmitting information about important events in Bangladesh.

Discrepancy in the use of newspapers and magazines between urban and rural areas reflects both access and literacy differences between these two types of areas in Bangladesh. Urban respondents were much more likely to use newspapers and magazines than rural respondents (31 per cent versus 10 per cent). Posters were also more likely to be used by urban than rural respondents (21 per cent versus 14 per cent).

There are also some divisional differences in the use of these sources of information. Respondents in Sylhet were most likely to have used television (91 per cent), whereas respondents in Rajshahi were least likely to have done so (62 per cent). On the other hand, use of the radio was highest in Rajshahi (41 per cent) but lowest in Khulna (25 per cent). The majority of those who had heard about voter registration activities in Khulna and Rajshahi learned about it through local community leaders (53 per cent each). Other local sources of information were more likely to be used in Rajshahi (23 per cent) and Barisal (20 per cent) than in Sylhet (two per cent) and Chittagong (eight per cent) (Figure 25).
 Those who reported receiving information on voter registration activities before the start of enumeration were also asked whether the information they received gave them all the details they needed for voter registration, only some of the details, or very little of the detail. The majority of respondents reported that the information they had received had given them all or some of the details they needed for voter registration (Figure 26).
Nearly half of respondents said that voter registration information gave them some of the details they needed (49 per cent), 36 per cent say it gave them all the details, and 15 per cent say it gave them very little of the detail they needed. Residents of urban areas were more likely than residents of rural areas to say that the information gave them all the details (45 per cent versus 33 per cent), while residents of rural areas were more likely to say that they received very little of the detail they needed (17 per cent versus nine per cent). This trend may reflect access to a greater variety of information sources enjoyed by urban respondents over rural respondents.

Residents of Sylhet were most likely to say that the information gave them all the details they needed (72 per cent), while residents of Barisal were least likely to say this (18 per cent). In Dhaka, 44 per cent said the information gave them all the details they needed.

Respondents to the voter-to-list survey were asked to report whether election officials had undertaken certain procedures that they were instructed to take during voter registration. Data from the survey indicate that for almost all households these steps were taken by election officials. The specific steps and the percentage of respondents who reported that they had been taken are as follows.

- Enumerator who visited home left a slip with a date to report to registration center (100 per cent)
- Voter’s photograph taken at registration center (99.9 per cent)
- Voter’s fingerprints taken at registration center (100 per cent)
- Voter’s information was recorded on a computer at registration center (99.9 per cent)
- Voter was given a receipt to indicate photo, fingerprints, and information were recorded at registration center (99.4 per cent)

Data on this question indicate that election officials and others involved in the registration process followed procedures in almost all cases. This, combined with the majority of voters being able to access information on the voter registration, was critical to ensuring the accuracy of the voter list.

**Voters have high level of confidence in registration process and accuracy of voter list**

All sampled voters in the list-to-voter survey as well as all respondents in the household voter-to-list survey were asked to assess the registration process and their confidence in the accuracy of the voter list. Data indicate that almost all respondents in each survey shared a positive assessment of the registration process and had confidence in the accuracy of the voter list (Figures 27 and 28).
Data indicate that the voter registration drive was overwhelmingly perceived as a success and has engendered confidence in the voter register that has resulted from it. Less than one per cent in either sample gave a negative assessment of the voter registration process or lacked confidence in the voter list. More than 99 per cent, on the other hand, are very or somewhat confident in the accuracy of the voter list.

Confidence in the voter registration process and in the voter list is expressed by all segments of Bangladeshi society and in all regions of the country. As this audit indicates, this widespread confidence in the accuracy of the voter list is well placed.

This audit has found the voter list to be highly accurate in capturing the information of registered voters, and also that the voter registration process was extremely effective in ensuring the registration of voting-age adults. The fact that data from the audit surveys are highly reliable, with a margin of error of plus/minus 1.5 per cent or less, should give confidence to all electoral stakeholders in the accuracy of the voter list to be utilized for the December 2008 election.
VIII. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF THE AUDIT
DATA

Comparison of the audit data in Bangladesh with audits and other data from other countries suggests that the voter registration in Bangladesh has been extremely effective in comparison to the other cases. The reader is urged to exercise a note of caution when comparing this date among different countries. The type of voter registration system utilized in a country and the age of the voter's list (in comparison to when an audit or other data analysis took place) are factors in assessing the relative completeness of the voter’s list as determined by an audit. Nevertheless, comparison of audit results for the Bangladesh voter’s list with similar data from other countries does suggest that the voter registration in Bangladesh was of a comparatively high quality.

The National Democratic Institute (NDI) conducted a voter’s list audit in select provinces in Indonesia prior to the 2004 elections. This audit found that 91% of eligible voters were found to be registered in these provinces. The audit also was able to locate 96% of voters who were on the voter’s list. The election commission in Indonesia, the KPU, used a procedure similar to that used in Bangladesh with enumerators visiting households in 2003 to register all adults in a household prior to the April 2004 legislative elections.

In 2007, a coalition of Pakistani NGOs supported by The Asia Foundation (TAF), the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), conducted an audit of the voter’s list based on the display of the provisional voter’s list. The analysis from the audit was reported at a household level. The audit found that nearly 27% of households had no adults listed in the voter’s list. The audit also found that only in 55% of households, the number of males exactly matched the number of males in the voter’s list for that household. For women, this percentage was only 40%.

IFES conducted an audit of the voter’s list in Armenia using the same type of methodology as in Bangladesh. This audit found that 17% of voters on the list could not be located at the address that was noted for them on the list, and that no reason was found for why these voters should not be on the list (e.g. working out of the country, parent’s address, etc.). In the voter-to-list sample in this audit, 11% of voters could not be found on the voter’s list.
IX. RECOMMENDED DATA INTEGRITY TESTING

The schedule has not allowed time for IFES to conduct data integrity tests; however, we have been informed that the BEC is carrying out a number of these tests as it receives data. The following tests are basically those IFES proposed at the inception of this project, with some modifications and additional recommendations incorporated as relevant to the changed circumstances. For each test, it has been noted whether the BEC is currently carrying out the test.

Data integrity testing of the voter register is designed to detect potential problems with the register with minimal investment of resources. The tests can be conducted by a single database expert and, in most cases, can be completed in a few days. Because of the efficiency of this type of testing, it is recommended that election management bodies institutionalize data integrity tests as an annual review that can help measure whether the quality of the register is improving, degrading or staying the same. For a newly compiled voter register, data integrity testing can provide a valuable diagnostic that can be published to increase confidence in the register or, in case of errors, can alert election managers to the type and scope of such errors and indicate the time and level of effort required to make corrections. Many database integrity errors can be corrected with simple update queries.

All tests should always be conducted on a ‘clone’ of the database in order to prevent any possibility of the tests introducing errors into the official voter register database.

In most circumstances, it is advisable to include a broad cross-section of stakeholders in the testing process. Nevertheless, the BEC should not immediately invite such participation. Although the field-testing (survey) would seem to indicate a high degree of accuracy in the data, there are types of errors that would not appear in a field test (survey). Therefore, there is a possibility that database integrity testing may uncover some significant errors. Such detection would be valuable information for the BEC, particularly in cases where the data may be cleaned up through simple database update operations (more detail on this at the end of this section). However, making stakeholders aware of such problems before the BEC has had a chance to address them could erode confidence in an otherwise accurate and credible voter list.

It should be noted that the following tests and SQL queries have been developed without access to the Bangladesh voter register database or software developers. Consequently, some of these tests may require modification based upon actual database structures and field names. The IT staff at the BEC will have more specific knowledge of these details and should be encouraged to conduct any additional tests they may deem useful, keeping in mind that the primary goal is to allow the BEC to detect and, if possible, repair any categories of errors that may exist.

Category 1 tests – validity of location information

Potential cause of error
These errors can be introduced by faulty enumeration, data-entry error, or errors in database processing. Note that these tests will not determine whether the location information is correct for each specific voter but only whether the information matches a valid location.

Consequence of undetected errors
Inadequate validation of location can lead to disenfranchisement through assigning voters to non-existent constituencies.
IMPORTANT NOTE: Errors in this category are the ones that can create confusion or even chaos if detected in large numbers during an election. Voters who know they were legitimately registered and whose names actually appear on the voter list may be unable to find their names because the name does not appear at the correct constituency. Fortunately, if the tests detect errors in this category, it is possible that such errors can be resolved through a simple database update operation. For example, in one country some registrars entered a code for sub-districts as 01, 02, 03, etc. while other registrars used 1, 2, 3 notation. If undiscovered this error would have resulted in the disenfranchisement of almost eight per cent of voters; however, once the problem was discovered, IT staff were able to change all sub-district codes to a common ‘01’ notation.

Current testing status – not confirmed
The BEC IT Department has not confirmed that it is carrying out these Category 1 tests, but mention of this testing may have been omitted since these tests are automatically performed through importing the data into a structured hierarchical database.

Even if the BEC chooses to delay all other database testing, Category 1 tests should be conducted. The consequence of undetected errors will be felt on Election Day, and the probability of being able to repair any detected errors is high.

1.1 Determine whether there are any voters assigned to an ‘orphan’ division
An ‘orphan’ division is one that does not appear in the official list of divisions.

SQL query:

```sql
SELECT division
FROM voter
LEFT OUTER JOIN division
ON (voter.division = division.name)
WHERE (division.id IS NULL)
```

Acceptable output: There should be no output from this query. Any rows returned by this query indicate a voter with an invalid value for division.

1.2 Determine whether there are any voters assigned to an ‘orphan’ district
An ‘orphan’ district is one that does not appear in the official list of districts.

SQL query:

```sql
SELECT district
FROM voter
LEFT OUTER JOIN district
ON (voter.district = district.name)
WHERE (district.id IS NULL)
```
Acceptable output: There should be no output from this query. Any rows returned by this query indicate a voter with invalid value for district.

1.3 Determine whether there are any voters assigned to an ‘orphan’ city
An ‘orphan’ city is one that does not appear in the official list of cities.

SQL query:
```
SELECT city
FROM voter
  LEFT OUTER JOIN city
  ON (voter.city = city.name)
WHERE (city.id IS NULL)
```

Acceptable output: There should be no output from this query. Any rows returned by this query indicate a voter with invalid value for city.

1.4 Determine whether there are any voters assigned to an ‘orphan’ upazila
An ‘orphan’ upazila is one that does not appear in the official list of upazila.

SQL query:
```
SELECT upazila
FROM voter
  LEFT OUTER JOIN upazila
  ON (voter.upazila = upazila.name)
WHERE (upazila.id IS NULL)
```

Acceptable output: There should be no output from this query. Any rows returned by this query indicate a voter with invalid value for upazila.

1.5 Determine whether there are any voters assigned to an ‘orphan’ Union
An ‘orphan’ union is one that does not appear in the official list of unions.

SQL query:
```
SELECT union
FROM voter
  LEFT OUTER JOIN union
  ON (voter.union = union.name)
WHERE (union.id IS NULL)
```

Acceptable output: There should be no output from this query. Any rows returned by this query indicate a voter with invalid value for union.
1.6 Determine whether there are any voters assigned to an ‘orphan’ voter area

An ‘orphan’ voter area is one that does not appear in the official list of voter areas.

SQL query:

```sql
SELECT voter_area
FROM voter
  LEFT OUTER JOIN voter_area
  ON (voter.voter_area = voter_area.name)
WHERE (voter_area.id IS NULL)
```

Acceptable output: There should be no output from this query. Any rows returned by this query indicate a voter with invalid value for voter area.

1.7 Determine whether there are any voters assigned to a district that is not within the assigned division

SQL query:

```sql
SELECT `voter`.division AS `division_1`, `voter`.district, COUNT(`voter`.id) AS `id_2`
FROM (`11_rajshahicc_final`.district `district`
  RIGHT OUTER JOIN `11_rajshahicc_final`.voter `voter`
  ON (`district`.name = `voter`.district)
  LEFT OUTER JOIN `11_rajshahicc_final`.division `division`
  ON (`division`.id = `district`.division)
WHERE (`division`.id IS NULL)
GROUP BY `voter`.division, `voter`.district
```

Acceptable output: There should be no output from this query. Any rows returned by this query indicate a voter with a district that is not within the division assigned to that voter.
1.8 Determine whether there are any voters assigned to a city that is not within the assigned district

**SQL query:**

```sql
SELECT `voter`.district AS `district_1`, `voter`.city, COUNT(`voter`.id) AS `id_2`
FROM ( `11_rajshahicc_final`.city `city`
    LEFT OUTER JOIN
    `11_rajshahicc_final`.voter `voter`
    ON (`city`.name = `voter`.district))
    RIGHT OUTER JOIN
    `11_rajshahicc_final`.district `district`
    ON (`district`.id = `city`.district)
WHERE (`district`.id IS NULL)
GROUP BY `voter`.district, `voter`.city

**Acceptable output:** There should be no output from this query. Any rows returned by this query indicate a voter with a city that is not within the district assigned to that voter.

1.9 Determine whether there are any voters assigned to a Thana that is not within the assigned city

**SQL query:**

```sql
SELECT `voter`.city AS `city_1`, `voter`.thana, COUNT(`voter`.id) AS `id_2`
FROM ( `11_rajshahicc_final`.thana `thana`
    LEFT OUTER JOIN
    `11_rajshahicc_final`.voter `voter`
    ON (`thana`.name = `voter`.thana))
    RIGHT OUTER JOIN
    `11_rajshahicc_final`.city `city`
    ON (`city`.id = `thana`.city)
WHERE (`city`.id IS NULL)
GROUP BY `voter`.city, `voter`.thana

**Acceptable output:** There should be no output from this query. Any rows returned by this query indicate a voter with an *thana* that is not within the city assigned to that voter.
1.10 Determine whether there are any voters assigned to an Union that is not within the assigned upazila

SQL query:

```
SELECT `voter`.upazila AS `upazila_1`, `voter`.union, COUNT(`voter`.id) AS `id_2`
FROM ( `11_rajshahicc_final`.district `union`
    RIGHT OUTER JOIN
    `11_rajshahicc_final`.voter `voter`
    ON (`union`.name = `voter`.union)
    LEFT OUTER JOIN
    `11_rajshahicc_final`.upozila `upazila`
    ON (`upazila`.id = `union`.upazila)
WHERE (`upazila`.id IS NULL)
GROUP BY `voter`.upazila, `voter`.union
```

**Acceptable output:** There should be no output from this query. Any rows returned by this query indicate a voter with a union that is not within the upazila assigned to that voter.

1.11 Determine whether there are any voters assigned to a voter area that is not valid for the assigned Union

SQL query:

To be defined

**Acceptable output:** There should be no output from this query. Any rows returned by this query indicate a voter with a voter area that is not valid for the union assigned to that voter.

**Category 2 tests – unique names**

**Potential cause of error**

These errors can be introduced by faulty enumeration or data-entry error. Note that these tests will not determine whether the name information is correct for each specific voter but only whether the information matches a valid Bangladeshi name.

**Consequence of undetected errors**

Large numbers of this category of error indicate data-entry quality issues, can undermine voter confidence, and can require significant long-term expense and effort to correct.

**Current testing status – confirmed**

The BEC IT Department has indicated that it is carrying out tests analyzing whether the gender of the voter matches the name of the voter. The list of unique names is a by-product of the ‘sex analysis’ tests being conducted by the BEC.
2.1 Analysis of person’s name distribution

Because ‘Name’ is a single field, this analysis requires a two-step process. Step 1 involves parsing all names into individual words and storing words in a separate table.

For example, Mohammed Kamrul Rahman would be parsed into:

**Name word table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Word</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mohammed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kamrul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rahman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Step 2 would be an analysis of that table to determine the number of times each word appears in the table.

**SQL query:**

```
SELECT word, COUNT(id) AS CountOf
FROM name_word
GROUP BY name_word
ORDER BY 2 DESC
```

**Acceptable output:** All name words should appear thousands of times. A single occurrence of a word or any unusually low count of occurrence of a word probably indicates a misspelling. For example, if a data entry error resulted in changing Rahman to 4ahman, this would probably result in a single occurrence. If there are a large number of misspellings, this is indicative of problems with quality control in data entry.

This test should be conducted on all Name fields—Father, Mother, Spouse.

**Category 3 tests – acceptable values**

**Potential cause of error**

These errors can be introduced by faulty enumeration or data-entry error combined with substandard database design and inadequate data validation rules built into the data-entry program. Note that these tests will not determine whether the name information is correct for each specific voter but only whether the information matches a valid option for the tested field (e.g., for Gender – Male/Female).

**Consequence of undetected errors**

Large numbers of this type error indicate inadequate validation at database and/or application level. These errors may require significant long-term expense and effort to correct and may necessitate modifications to the system design.

**Current testing status – confirmed**

The BEC is currently conducting ‘acceptable value’ testing for Gender, Marital Status, Occupation, Disability, Birth Place, Religion, Education, and Blood Group.
3.1 Determine whether all data for Gender matches are acceptable values

SQL query:
```
SELECT gender, COUNT(id)
FROM voter
GROUP BY gender
```

Acceptable output: There should be only two possible values. Since the field is defined as 128 characters, it is not clear from the database structure how Gender will be represented, but it should be consistent (e.g., M/F, or Male/Female).

3.2 Determine whether all data for Marital Status matches are acceptable values

SQL query:
```
SELECT marital, COUNT(id)
FROM voter
GROUP BY marital
```

Acceptable output: There should be a limited number of values (e.g., Single, Married, Divorced, Widowed). Since the field is defined as 128 characters it is not clear from the database structure how Marital Status will be represented, but it should be consistent (e.g., S/M/D/W, or Single/Married/Divorced/Widowed).

3.3 Determine whether all data for Occupation matches are acceptable values

SQL query:
```
SELECT occupation, COUNT(id)
FROM voter
GROUP BY occupation
```

Acceptable output: There should be a fairly large but limited number of occupations with consistent representation for similar occupations (e.g., the system should not allow Professional, Profess., Prof’l, etc. but should have one consistent designation for Professional).

3.4 Determine whether all data for Disability matches are acceptable values

SQL query:
```
SELECT disability, COUNT(id)
FROM voter
GROUP BY disability
```

Acceptable output: There should only be a limited number of values with consistent representation for all similar disabilities.
3.4 Determine whether all data for Religion matches are acceptable values

SQL query:

```sql
SELECT religion, COUNT(id)
FROM voter
GROUP BY religion
```

Acceptable output: There should be a limited number of values with consistent representation for all similar religions.

3.5 Determine whether all data for Education matches are acceptable values

SQL query:

```sql
SELECT education, COUNT(id)
FROM voter
GROUP BY education
```

Acceptable output: There should be a limited number of values with consistent representation for all similar education levels.

3.6 Determine whether all data for Blood Group matches are acceptable values

SQL query:

```sql
SELECT blood, COUNT(id)
FROM voter
GROUP BY blood
```

Acceptable output: There should be a limited number of valid blood groups with all persons of the same blood group represented in the same way.

Category 4 tests – demographic analysis

Potential cause of irregularity
Irregularities in demographic distribution of voters can be the result of various legitimate causes—high student population, large gender-specific job market, loss of male population due to war, etc.

Consequence of undetected errors
Barring irregularities, an age analysis of voters should result in a somewhat bell-shaped curve, i.e., lower number of 18–21-year-olds, maximum number of voters aged in their 30s, significant tapering off from 50 years onward. Similarly, gender ratios should remain more or less equal across all constituencies. Demographic analysis will detect any national or regional anomalies in the age/gender distribution of voters that may require further investigation. Significant unexplained anomalies may be an indication of systematic fraud.

Specific demographic tests to be conducted
Exact definition of queries requires examination of the data.
Current testing status – partially confirmed
The BEC has indicated that it is currently carrying out ‘age analysis’ tests to determine the ‘band pattern of voters of different age’. This testing also creates a list of underage voters or voters with an unusually old age. There is no mention of stratification by a combination of age/gender and, if this is not currently being done, this analysis is recommended.

Outputs of data integrity testing
Testing of place names and geographical validity will result in either a clear indication that database design and data-entry practices made it impossible to have any error in this category, or a detailed list of errors. The detailed list would include the category (division, district, upazila, etc.), the misspelled or misplaced name, and the number of voters assigned to the invalid place.

Unique names testing will produce two outputs. Firstly, there is a list of all individual ‘name words’, separated by gender (i.e., male names, female names, gender-neutral names). Secondly, there is a list of all names that appear rarely in the register (the exact threshold will be determined after study of the names). The value of the outputs is two-fold—in addition to information on the number of errors of this type, the list of correct names can be used for future validation that can improve the quality of data entry.

Acceptable values testing will give a breakdown of all fields that have a limited number of ‘correct’ values, a list of valid values, and a list of all data that fall outside the bounds of these values. The list of valid values can provide a valuable resource as look-up tables or a validation dictionary to improve the quality of future data entry.

Demographic analysis will provide a statistical breakdown of voters by age and gender. In addition to detecting any anomalies that require further investigation, this breakdown can be useful in identifying any segments of the population who may be underrepresented, which can serve as a basis for future targeted voter information campaigns.

Recommendations for data integrity testing
In addition to the specific outputs listed above, data integrity testing will allow extrapolation to address the following issues.

Are there adequate controls in place to ensure that every voter is identified with a valid constituency?

Are there adequate validation rules to enforce consistency in data entry for all ‘limited value’ fields?

Is there adequate quality assurance to produce highly accurate data entry?

If the answer to any of these questions is negative, this should alert the BEC to a need for focused clean-up of errors caused by the omission. This information can help guide BEC IT staff in developing any additional validation routines and procedures to ensure continuous improvement of the quality of the voter list.

The value of these tests is significant enough that we encourage the BEC to carry out testing as soon as data are available. This report contains a detailed set of tests designed to detect potential problems with the voter register with minimal investment of resources. Making stakeholders aware of such problems, even before the BEC has a chance to address them, could enhance confidence in the Commission.
The most needed tests identified are validity of location information (Category 1) tests. Errors in this category can create some confusion during an election. Voters who know they were legitimately registered and whose names actually appear on the voter list may be unable to vote if database integrity errors cause their names to appear at a wrong or non-existent voter area (constituency). If tests detect errors in this category, such errors can be resolved through simple database update operations (described in the report).

Besides detecting potential errors, database integrity testing can provide additional benefits. Testing of ‘place names’ can ensure consistency in a set of geographical and administrative division tables that can be used to validate all future data additions and changes. ‘Unique names’ testing can produce a data dictionary of valid names that can be used to double-check all future name changes and additions in order to detect typographical errors. ‘Acceptable values’ testing can produce a set of look-up tables for fields such as gender, religion, occupation, blood type, etc. so that future data entry for these fields can be multiple-choice instead of free-text fields. Demographic analysis can provide useful baseline information to assist the BEC with designing targeted voter information campaigns and registration drives to boost registration numbers in the event of under-represented segments of the population.
## ANNEX 1
### ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BEC</td>
<td>Bangladesh Election Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FVL</td>
<td>final voter list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFES</td>
<td>International Foundation for Electoral Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERP</td>
<td>Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPB</td>
<td>Support to the Electoral Process in Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SQL</td>
<td>Structured Query Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>Survey and Research System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VR</td>
<td>voter register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VL</td>
<td>voter list</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# ANNEX 2
## LIST OF PERSONS MET BY THE ASSESSMENT TEAM

Meetings were held with a range of people and organizations who are stakeholders in the voter registration process either in the past or currently. This list is not exhaustive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Name and position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh Election Commission</td>
<td>Dr ATM Shamsul Huda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Election Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muhammed Sohul Hussain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Election Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brigadier General Muhammad Sakhawat Hussain, NDC, PSC (Retd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Election Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Commission Secretariat</td>
<td>Md. Humayun Kabir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rafiqul Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammad Salauddin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant District Commissioner Manikgonj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Ashraful Anam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IT Team Manager, SEPB Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A.R. Azimul Hoque (Raihan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National ICT Consultant, SEPB Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of Electoral Roll</td>
<td>Brigadier General Shahadat Hossain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with Photographs</td>
<td>Chowdhury, AFWC, PSC, TE</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Project Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
<td>Jessica Murray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Program Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steve Canham</td>
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<td>Senior Technical Advisor</td>
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<td><strong>International Republican Institute (IRI)</strong></td>
<td>Robert Juhkam&lt;br&gt;Deputy Country Director</td>
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<td><strong>National Democratic Institute (NDI)</strong></td>
<td>Jeff Vaness&lt;br&gt;Resident Country Director</td>
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<td><strong>European Union</strong></td>
<td>Najia K. Hashemee&lt;br&gt;Program Manager</td>
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<td><strong>British High Commission</strong></td>
<td>Jonatan Henriksson&lt;br&gt;Attaché</td>
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<td><strong>Department for International Development (DFID)</strong></td>
<td>Honor Flanagan&lt;br&gt;Governance Advisor</td>
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<td><strong>Office of Democracy and Government</strong></td>
<td>Todd Sorensen&lt;br&gt;Director</td>
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<td><strong>USAID</strong></td>
<td>Lazhar Aloui&lt;br&gt;Senior Governance and election Adviser</td>
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<td><strong>The Asia Foundation</strong></td>
<td>Jerome Sayre&lt;br&gt;Deputy Country Representative</td>
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<td><strong>Odhikar</strong></td>
<td>Sheela Tasneem Haq&lt;br&gt;Senior Program Officer Rights and Governance</td>
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<td><strong>Jatiya Nirbachon Parjobekkhon Parishad</strong></td>
<td>Professor Dr Nazmul Ahsan&lt;br&gt;JANIPOP Kalimullah</td>
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<td><strong>Survey Companies</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Somra-MBL Limited</strong></td>
<td>Md. Monjur Iqbal&lt;br&gt;Managing Director</td>
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<td><strong>Survey and Research System (SRS)</strong></td>
<td>Siddiquer Rahman&lt;br&gt;Acting Chairman</td>
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<td><strong>OrgQuest</strong></td>
<td>Monzurul Haque</td>
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<td><strong>Support to the Electoral Process in Bangladesh (SRGB)</strong></td>
<td>M. Saidul Haq</td>
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ANNEX 4
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (IFES)

International Foundation for Electoral Systems, IFES, is an international, non-partisan democracy development organization that works to give people a voice in the way they are governed. IFES is the world’s premiere election assistance organization, providing countries with technical advice and tools to run democratic elections. Every IFES project is staffed by local personnel and partnered with local organizations. With this homegrown approach, IFES ensures the expertise it offers fits the needs of the country or client and the benefit of assistance outlasts the life of the project.

IFES understands that genuine and lasting democratic change begins in-country. Our founder, F. Clifton White, believed that there was no ‘blueprint for democracy’. Two decades later, White’s philosophy drives our work as we partner with local organizations, tailor assistance to a country’s situation, history and culture, and offer comprehensive, objective expertise designed to create sustainable change. IFES develops and implements integrated, collaborative solutions in the areas of democratic institution-building and participatory governance, which have reached 112 countries worldwide, including Thailand, Nepal, Cambodia, Indonesia, East Timor, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Mongolia, Pakistan, and India. The end goal is to create systems and procedures that increase accountability and transparency, and serve the interests of ordinary citizens.

IFES has extensive experience in managing projects funded by US government agencies, UNDP, CIDA, and DFID. IFES currently manages 74 projects worldwide for a total amount of US$ 216,683,982, with current annual revenue of US$ 70,000,000. Among these active projects, eight are DRL grants with a total value of US$ 5,221,000 for programming in Burundi, DRC, the MENA region, Lebanon, Ecuador, Thailand, Pakistan and Timor-Leste.

Elections and political processes

Strengthen government institutions
These projects help establish institutions and procedures that enable election officials to conduct free and fair elections. We offer a full range of services in support of the electoral process cycle including: advising election commissions; assisting with the development or reform of election laws; training election workers; and developing effective voter education programs.

Civil society and civic education

Help citizens participate in their democracies
Our projects promote the rights of disadvantaged groups, develop the independence and skills of the media, build coalitions of civil society organizations, develop and distribute civic education materials, and introduce government monitoring tools and techniques.
Good governance

Increase politicians’ accountability to the electorate

Our projects promote government accountability and dialogue among agencies, political parties and citizens’ groups. We encourage good governance by increasing knowledge of government actions through public information, empowering citizens and journalists to identify and expose corruption, and help government officials develop needed skills to serve constituents and implement decentralized governance.

Our staff

The makeup of IFES’ staff reflects our international outlook. Every project office is staffed by local personnel and every project partners with local experts. IFES’ nearly 400 employees include specialists in election administration, rule of law, civil society development, good governance, applied research, human rights, gender issues, and information technology solutions. IFES employees also represent 60 countries across the world.